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THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC APPROACH 





The purpose of this study is to examine the applicability of a strategic approach to 
contingency contracting. Strategic approaches to procurement are successful in both 
industry and the Department of Defense; however, the contingency arena is often 
overlooked. Corporations are finding a strategic enterprise orientation to procurement can 
create or enhance their own competitive position within a market. This is done by 
identifying opportunities to leverage purchases—thus reducing costs by more than any 
subsequent trade-off to product market value or identifying opportunities to increase 
product value by more than any subsequent trade-off to cost.  Indeed, the purpose of 
competitive advantage is to create the largest delta between a cost position and product 
market value or customer willingness-to-pay. 
This project applies the principles of competitive advantage and with them, 
creates a strategic approach to contingency contracting operations. This paper first 
recommends the DoD create a centralized activity, such as Joint Contracting Command-
Iraq/Afghanistan, to consolidate contracting activities within a Combatant Commander’s 
contingency theater. Secondarily, this discussion suggests the DoD initiate spend analysis 
of all contracting activities within Combatant Command geographic regions. The DoD 
can identify opportunities to capture maximum value from key regional suppliers. This 
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This paper presents a strategic approach to contingency contracting operations. 
The vast amount of contracting support within both Combatant Command’s regional 
contingency theaters and geographic theaters presents opportunities through which the 
DoD can capture more value. Additional value is captured by rationalizing suppliers into 
a framework to achieve Combatant Command’s strategic objectives. First, a central 
contingency contracting organization needs to establish command and control over 
theater-wide contracting requirements. Obligation authority is a key strategic tool—one 
which Combatant Commanders do not possess. This tool needs to align with the 
Combatant Commanders’ strategic contingency objectives. For example, this strategic 
tool can not only rebuild a country, but can also work to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of key strategic markets such as cement production, metal works, and 
facility and infrastructure repair. Second, a spend analysis of geographic suppliers can 
rationalize the supply base, which identifies opportunities to decrease cost by more than 
the subsequent trade-off to product value or opportunities to increase product value by 
more than the subsequent trade-off to cost. In the commercial sector, these trade-offs 
enhance competitive market position and relate directly to competitive advantage. Third, 
identifying key regional suppliers through spend analysis can both aid in planning and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a broad overview for the need of a 
strategic approach to contingency contracting. The Department of Defense (DoD) no 
longer perceives procurement as a tactical function; consequently, the DoD’s acquisitions 
are shifting from a transaction-oriented mission to a strategic-oriented enterprise 
(Rendon, 2005). According to the DoD, strategic sourcing is a collaborative and 
structured process of analyzing an organization's spend and using the information to 
make business decisions about acquisition commodities and services more effectively and 
efficiently (OUSD, 2007). The DoD, the largest global purchasing entity, recognizes the 
value of strategic sourcing and is transforming military acquisitions by implementing 
strategic sourcing initiatives (OMB, 2005). However, these initiatives target most of the 
acquisition spectrum with the exception of contingency contracting. This paper views the 
acquisition spectrum, Figure 1, ranging across major acquisitions, operational 
contracting, and contingency contracting. Thus, if a strategic approach is deemed 
valuable to implement on one end of the spectrum, this research investigates whether it 
will add value to the other side as well.  
 
 





Recent contingency operations have consisted of numerous uncoordinated efforts 
to provide extraordinary amounts of contracted support. As the military reduces organic 
capability, procurement becomes a key strategic function to meet the increasing 
requirements. The DoD needs to shift to a geographic enterprise-wide procurement 
approach from its current tactical orientation. The planning and execution of contingency 
contracting within a strategic framework will allow for better alignment with the 
combatant commander’s strategic objectives. Viewing contingency contracting as a 
tactical function can inundate the battlefield with excessive contracting units. This 
presents several potential problems for the DoD— specifically, inefficient use of scarce 
resources, vulnerability of supply disruptions, insufficient planning to support the 
strategic objectives, and several policy and contract accountability chains. 
Efficient use of scarce resources, specifically personnel and money, is critical 
during a contingency. A tactical approach fragments DoD-wide service and commodity 
support requirements as well as resources for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine 
Corps and their field offices to execute. Tactical contracting units are procuring similar 
requirements, often in close proximity to one another, without coordinating or 
consolidating across units and agencies. Consequently, many local transactions are 
duplicating the same personnel efforts. Many transactions decrease economies of scale 
and leverage over suppliers (Kraljic, 1983). The problem compounds when units then 
compete for the same local goods and services.  
A tactical view uses contracting as buyers with high variation and little 
specialization. Many dealings with local external sources and the consequential lack of 
specialization limits foresight of possible supply disruptions. Tactical contracting deals 
with 2nd- and 3rd-tier suppliers instead of dealing with the 1st-tier or main providers of a 
commodity or service. Each tactical unit executes the fragmented requirements in its own 
interests without sight of the joint strategic supply chain and battlefield. 
The lack of a strategic vision tends to render contingency contracting a reactive 
function. Tactical contracting units are reacting to support predictable and widespread 
requirements. A strategic framework could proactively engage these requirements during 
the contingency planning phase. Underestimating the strategic importance of the 
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contracting function prior to a contingency appears to result in unrealized capabilities and 
lack of cost savings. An inefficient and uncoordinated network of tactical contracting 
units may be an additional consequence of inadequate planning. 
Fragmenting DoD requirements to multiple agencies also fragments contract 
visibility and accountability. Multiple DoD agencies have contract authority to support 
the combatant commander, who is responsible for the entire battlefield and geographic 
region. Agencies create tactical contracting frameworks of sub-units which do not 
directly align to the combatant commander. This lack of coordination reduces contract 
visibility and accountability across the entire battlefield and region. Tactical contingency 
contracting does not provide the combatant commander a regional organization or 
framework in which to maximize the impact of contingency contracting planning and 
support of strategic objectives. Aggregating the requirements back to the strategic level 
can proactively engage internal variables and external threats to the supply chain to 
effectively and efficiently support mission requirements through service and commodity 
sourcing strategies. 
B. BACKGROUND  
Global industry leaders understand the strategic importance of purchasing. Many 
high-performance companies are now focusing on core competencies and relying on 
external sources for non-core activities. The application of a strategic approach to 
purchasing has resulted in significant cost savings to industry leaders (Rendon, 2005). 
These commercial powerhouses use procurement strategies to leverage their purchases 
through select strategic suppliers rather than multiple vendors. Each firm’s procurement 
strategy is a component of the overall business strategy to gain and maintain a 
competitive advantage over competitors. 
Similar to the commercial sector, the DoD continues to decrease its organic 
capability to focus on its core competencies and rely on external sources for non-core 
activities. As internal capability decreases, the scope and strategic importance of the 
contracting function increases to support these core competencies. Current DoD and 
service-component business transformation efforts tailor commercial best practices 
toward the more efficient and effective use of scarce resources to train and equip the 
warfighter (Defense Business Transformation Agency, 2006a). Collectively, such best 
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practices point toward a shift from tactical or transaction purchasing to strategic sourcing. 
Tactical purchasing employs a majority of personnel as ordering agents and places few at 
strategic levels. The inverse is a strategic approach to procurement, which focuses a 
majority of personnel toward strategic supply management. Aggregating tactical 
requirements emphasizes service and commodity sourcing strategies. These strategies 
create purchasing leverage and economies of scale to effectively and efficiently equip the 
warfighter (Moore, Baldwin, Camm & Cook, 2002). 
Service components are responsible to train and equip the warfighter while 
geographical combatant commands conduct military wartime contingency operations. 
Each service provides trained and equipped forces to the combatant commanders—giving 
the commanders the capability to execute contingency operations. Although these 
capabilities consist of each service’s core competencies, the combatant commanders are 
left with a support void that can only be filled with external resources. However, 
combatant commanders do not have contracting authority to meet the requirements 
resulting from this support void. Instead, the combatant commanders rely on the services 
to provide the necessary contracting support to fill the void, resulting in multiple 
contracting activities operating throughout the contingency theater and geographic 
region. This presents the DoD with the opportunity to create more value by applying a 
strategic approach to contracting—aligning contracting strategy with the objectives of the 
combatant commander. 
C. PURPOSE  
The objective of this research is to explore the application of a strategic approach 
to contingency contracting operations to more effectively and efficiently plan and support 
contingency operations. From a view above the tactical landscape, a strategic approach 
fulfills all requirements to achieve the mission. From this view, contingency contracting 
support will operate within a framework to conduct internal and external supply 
management at a strategic level while maintaining tactical support and relationships with 
the end-user. Such a view of the dynamic contingency landscape allows contracting to 
proactively manage the supply chain to support core competencies. 
This report will assess the value of a strategic approach to contingency 
contracting operations. It will evaluate the extent to which a strategic approach might be 
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as important and viable in a contingency as it is in the DoD’s current state-side strategic 
sourcing transformation. During the last few years, business transformation initiatives 
within the DoD have overlooked contingency contracting. Best practices from private 
industry, as well as the DoD’s existing strategic sourcing initiatives, will be examined. 
Through this analysis, the research will illustrate a potential solution to alleviate the 
current contingency contracting problems. This solution will place an emphasis on 
shifting from tactical and reactive contracting to strategic and proactive contracting by 
implementing a strategic framework to contingency contracting operations. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The military’s organic capabilities have significantly diminished, which is 
triggering a high demand for external capabilities (Zamparelli, 1999). This is 
transforming contingency contracting into a strategic function. In today’s environment, 
the success of a contingency operation does not solely rest upon the military’s organic 
capabilities; rather, it heavily depends on the ability to leverage external capabilities. 
Implementing a strategic approach can increase the value DoD can capture from external 
suppliers, aid in the planning of contingency operations, and directly align with 
combatant commanders’ strategic objectives. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this study is:  How can a strategic approach be 
applied to contingency contracting? From this question, secondary questions will aide in 
determining the need for applying a strategic approach to contingency contracting: 
• What value can be added by implementing a strategic approach to 
contingency contracting?  
• How does the DoD capture more value by using principles of competitive 
advantage from industry? 
• What commercial and military best practices are applicable to a strategic 
contingency contracting framework? 
• How can the DoD integrate contingency contracting at the strategic level to 
leverage and manage the supply chain? 
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F. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 
Following this introduction, Chapter II will begin with a literature review of 
strategy and competitive advantage. Classic models on strategic approaches to purchasing 
and supply management will follow. From this foundation, commercial and military 
initiatives will illustrate how these best practices enhance core competencies and create 
additional value for the warfighter. Chapter III will provide a background on contingency 
contracting, both past operations and those transforming contingency contracting today— 
specifically, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) in Iraq. A thorough review of after-action reports (AAR) from 
contingency contracting officers (CCO) who have redeployed, interviews with senior 
DoD acquisition professionals, and other governmental reports will enable the authors to 
determine the need for a strategic approach to contingency contracting. Chapter IV will 
apply strategic theories and best practices discussed in Chapter II to the current problems 
in contingency contracting revealed in Chapter III. Chapter V will provide an overall 
conclusion that suggests a strategic contingency contracting framework to better support 
operations; it will also include recommendations for additional research. 
G. SUMMARY  
This chapter discussed the need for the DoD to shift from a tactical contingency 
contracting structure to a strategic enterprise structure. A strategic structure can more 
efficiently use resources, mitigate the risk of supply disruptions, provide a geographic 
supply base to aid planning, and centralize policy and contract accountability chains. The 
background gave examples of the strategic importance purchasing plays to both industry 
and the DoD. Furthermore, the background section revealed an opportunity for the DoD 
to create more value by applying a strategic approach to contracting aligning contracting 
strategy with the objectives of the combatant commander. The next section stated the 
paper’s purpose, exploring the application of a strategic approach to contingency 
contracting to more effectively and efficiently plan and support contingency operations. 
The significance of the paper’s research was then examined followed by the primary and 
secondary research questions. The final section of this chapter described the organization 
and methodology of the research.  
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II. STRATEGIC APPROACH TO PROCUREMENT 
The dynamic nature of the business world requires organizations to constantly 
examine their internal processes, as well as their market position. The literature review 
illustrates the purchasing function as a business process capable of creating a sustainable 
competitive position over the opposition. A firm’s purchasing function is rapidly 
evolving into a strategic process integrated into overall corporate strategy. The DoD 
recognizes the value of a strategic approach for purchasing and is transforming military 
acquisitions by implementing strategic sourcing initiatives. 
This chapter first examines corporate strategy and competitive advantage. Next, 
the discussion explains how market economics and competitive forces within market 
structures impact a firm’s strategy. The market structure section develops and leads into a 
study of the supply chain and the concept of supply-chain management. The subsequent 
section will examine the evolution of purchasing to supply management, a strategic 
approach to purchasing. This chapter concludes with commercial examples illustrating 
how a firm’s purchasing decisions align with its strategy, followed by a review of the 
DoD’s applications of a strategic approach to military acquisition.  
A. STRATEGY AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE  
In today’s business world, it is important for an organization, and especially its 
leadership, to fully understand the powerful impact that a well-planned strategy has on 
creating and sustaining a firm’s competitive advantage. In spite of that, many 
organizations have a misconstrued or ambiguous comprehension of strategy. Firms 
confuse operational effectiveness with strategy—causing companies to focus on 
outperforming their competitors instead of differentiating themselves from the 
competition. Porter, a leading authority on strategy, asserts operational effectiveness and 
strategy function extremely differently; however, both are critical elements for an 
organization to achieve superior performance over its competitors (Porter, 1996). This 
section will examine the differences between operational effectiveness and strategy, as 
well as the factors a firm needs to consider when developing a strategy—which include 
trade-offs, value chain, and how a firm’s activities must strategically fit together. 
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1. Operational Effectiveness 
According to Porter (1996), operational effectiveness means performing similar 
activities better than rivals perform them. Operational effectiveness includes improving 
efficiency, as well as many other aspects that allow a company to better utilize its 
resources. In recent years, companies have realized this operational agenda, improving 
production and quality, by implementing industry best practices such as Just-in-time 
inventory, Lean Six Sigma, Total Quality Management, and Business Process 
Reengineering. These methods enable a firm to obtain remarkable operational 
enhancements, but these improvements do not lead to a sustainable profit or competitive 
advantage for a business. The more benchmarking and outsourcing firms do, often across 
the same activities, the more generic these activities become. Porter argues the worst 
mistake a company can make strategically is to compete with rivals on the same 
dimensions. Any organization, including competitors, can adopt industry best practices. 
Thus, in the operational agenda, no one firm will have a distinctive or sustainable 
competitive advantage from the others (Porter, 1996). 
2. Strategy and Competitive Advantage 
In contrast to operational effectiveness, companies with a strategic agenda attempt 
to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage by performing the same activities 
differently or by executing different activities than their competitors (Porter, 1996). 
Strategic positioning creates a unique and sustainable competitive position over 
competitors; this is called a competitive advantage. Porter (1985) identifies two types of 
competitive advantage: cost and differentiation. A business with a cost leadership 
advantage focuses all activities toward a low-cost offering providing more total value 
than similar products or services as its competitors but at a lower cost position. A cost 
advantage strategy analyzes the businesses discrete activities and makes trade-offs 
between cost and value. An example of such a trade-off is a reduction of cost by two 
units with a subsequent trade-off to value of only a single unit. A differentiation 
competitive advantage is when a firm differentiates itself from competitors in a unique 
way providing something valuable to buyers commanding a price premium. The key to a 
differentiation advantage is to provide a unique offering adding value above the costs of 
being unique (Porter, 1985). Procurement has strategic significance in almost every 
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industry (Porter, 1985) by contributing to the advantage an organization seeks in two 
ways: 1) work to reduce product input costs without trading-off a greater reduction in 
overall product value or 2) work to increase product value by more than the trade-off of a 
cost increase (Ghemwhat & Rivkin, 2006). 
How a firm positions itself, either low cost, being different, or a blend of (low 
cost against some competitors and differentiation against other competitors) is the key 
element in its competitive strategy. In addition to the cost or differentiation strategy, a 
focus strategy targets a segment of customers, or on accessing a segment of customers 
with a different set of activities. The worst mistake a firm can make is to not define a 
strategy and become stuck in the middle (Porter, 1980). 
According to Porter, a firm’s strategy is a way of combining the activities of 
various functional departments, which prevents these departments from operating 
independently. The success of a strategy depends on this internally consistent set of 
objectives and policies—which parallel the company’s strengths and weaknesses with the 
external opportunities and threats within a dynamic environment. Strategy is creating a 
unique and sustainable competitive position which requires trade-offs, effective value-
chain execution, and a continued strategic fit between all activities (Porter, 1991). The 
remainder of this section will examine trade-offs, value chains, strategic fit and their 
relation to strategy. 
a. Trade-offs 
Trade-offs enable a company to examine the contradictory agendas of 
different strategic positions (Porter, 1996). For example, if a company strategically 
positions itself as a high-cost or premium producer of a good, then the firm cannot target 
the low-end market segment at the same time. Targeting the low-end market segment will 
dilute the firm’s premium strategic position. Additionally, trade-offs indicate a 
company’s willingness to focus more on a set of new activities and less on its current 
activities. For example, focusing on a new set of activities may require significant 
retooling of equipment, production configurations, or different employee behavior 
(Porter, 1996).  
Many organizations may realize that a competitor’s successful strategic 
position is a valuable lucrative venture and, thus, will try to emulate it. Many firms 
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attempting to imitate a competitor’s position will find that trade-offs are needed to 
maintain the desired strategic position. An organization cannot choose to accomplish both 
sets of activities without major negative repercussions to its business. Trade-offs limit 
what firms can offer and protect against what other firms seek to emulate: a strategic 
position (Porter, 1996). A firm needs to directly focus on the set of activities, called a 
value chain, which will support its strategy. 
b. Value Chain 
All organizations are a collection of activities that function to support all 
facets of its products or services (Porter, 1985). Porter created the value-chain model, 
represented in Figure 2, identifing how a firm’s activities integrate to create value and a 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). As illustrated in Figure 2, a company’s profit 
margin relies on the effective execution of its internal activities. This will cause its 
customers’ willingness to pay for the goods or services to exceed the expenditures of the 
firm’s value chain, thus increasing value and profit. A company’s value chain must create 
more value than its competitors to obtain a competitive advantage. The source of a 
competitive advantage stems from the differences among competitors’ distinct activities, 
or “value chains” (Porter, 1985). A critical component of competitive advantage, as well 








Figure 2.   The Value Chain 
(From Porter, 1980) 
 
c. Strategic Fit 
The firm must ensure that all the activities chosen fit strategically together. 
According to Porter, positioning determines the set of activities a firm will implement 
and how the activities are interrelated. Operational effectiveness is concentrated on 
reaching excellence in each activity; strategy is about integrating the activities (Porter, 
1996). An organization has to remain supportive and consistent between its value chain 
and strategy to preserve its competitive advantage. Firms have to remain consistent and 
cognizant of dynamic external factors. A value chain is comprised of primary activities 
and support activities that affect a company’s overall profit margin. When an 
organization finds the set of activities that strategically fit together and the system 
functions well, this will add incredible value to the company—ultimately creating or 
sustaining a competitive advantage. 
 When developing a strategy, a firm must consider trade-offs, the value 
chain, and the synthesis of the firm’s strategic activities. In addition, an organization has 
to effectively manage the value system, which can create and sustain a competitive 
advantage. The next section discusses competitive forces influencing strategy within 
market structures. 
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B. MARKET STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS  
Global firms operate in market structures resembling a jungle of competitive 
forces—including rivals, buyers, suppliers and threats of both substitutes and new 
entrants (Porter, 1979). This section focuses on market economics and the competitive 
forces firms face within market structures. Porter creates a framework for crafting 
strategies by understanding competitive forces pushing toward market equilibrium. 
Market structure and competitive forces present principles significant to the DoD’s 
strategic operating and purchasing decisions. The DoD can use purchasing to strategically 
influence market structures. 
1. Market Economics 
Market economies typically promote overall economic well-being. In 1776, Adam 
Smith observed the “invisible hand.” Households and firms interact in markets, thus 
achieving outcomes in which prices reflect a goods value to society and a goods cost to 
society. Collectively, individual decisions, for the most part, maximize the welfare of 
society as a whole. A competitive market is a market in which many buyers and sellers 
interact, each having a negligible impact on price. Market price and quantity resides at 
market equilibrium—where supply equals demand (Mankiw, 2004). 
Market equilibrium, within a perfectly competitive market, presents the worst 
prospects for a firm’s long-run profitability. A firm’s strategy should identify competitive 
forces driving toward equilibrium within a market structure. The firm should then seek an 
industry position to best defend against or influence these forces favorably (Porter, 1979). 
2. Market Competitive Forces 
There are numerous competitive forces shaping a firm’s strategy. Porter’s (1979) 
model presents five competitive forces shaping strategy, as shown in Figure 3: rivalry 
among firms, threat of new entrants, threat of substitutes, power of consumers, and power 
of suppliers. Other forces not included in Porter’s model are: complements, regulators, 
media, and investors (Coughlan, 2007). This view of competition depicts competitive 
forces within a market structure from which to derive strategy. Too often firms and 
customers, including the government, view competitive forces narrowly by only 
considering rivalry, the inner most ring of Figure 3 (Porter, 1979). However, Porter 
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presents four additional forces surrounding rivalry, each attempting to reduce a firm’s 
long-run profitability. The remainder of this section briefly describes the characteristics 
of these five competitive forces.  
a. Rivalry Among Firms 
Competition between existing firms provides the most basic element of a 
competitive landscape. However, price competition often leaves entire industries worse-
off in terms of profitability (Porter, 1979). 
b. Threat of New Entrants 
Firms constantly threaten to enter profitable markets. Ultimately, new 
entrants bring more capacity and a desire to capture market share. Factors influencing 
threat of entry include expectations of incumbent retaliation and barriers to entry. 
Incumbent retaliation is a strategic barrier, such as increasing a marketing campaign or 
lowering prices to deter entry. Six examples of structural barriers to entry influencing 
markets are: economies of scale, product differentiation, capital requirements, cost 
disadvantages, access to distribution channels and government policy (Porter, 1979). 
c. Threat of Substitutes 
Substitutes are often interchangeable goods used in place of each other 
(Mankiw, 2004) pressuring industry profitability (Porter, 1980). Ultimately, the threat 
depends on the surplus value the substitute provides consumers in relation to the primary 
product (Porter, 1980). Consumer surplus measures the value a consumer captures 
between the price and willingness to pay for the product (Mankiw, 2004).  
d. Power of Consumers 
Powerful customers reduce profitability by demanding high quality and 
low price by pitting producers against each other. Several factors influence buyer power, 
including purchase volume, product differentiation, switching costs, and importance of 
product. A concentrated consumer base or a consumer purchasing significant volume can 






e. Power of Suppliers 
Powerful suppliers can squeeze industry profitability by raising prices or 
reducing quality. Sources of supplier power include: circumstance in which the relative 
concentration of suppliers is greater than buyers or the buyers are more fragmented than 
the suppliers, relative importance of customer market, importance of supplier’s product, 
low threat of forward integration, and lack of substitutes (Porter, 1980). 
 
 
Figure 3.   Market Competitive Forces 
(After Porter, 1980) 
 Strategists need to understand these forces to favorably influence company 
position (Porter, 1979). An ideal position seeks low competitive forces. Such a position 
will yield high profits that garner the attention of others. The dynamic market structure 
requires constant monitoring and positioning to continually exploit the five forces of 
competition. In addition to a five-forces analysis, firms should identify the characteristics 
of the primary, supply, and customer market: fragmented, emerging, maturing, declining, 





 The outermost ring of Figure 3 presents an extended perspective of market 
structure, ranging from initial suppliers to end consumers. This view of market structure 
begins to resemble a supply chain, integrating competitive forces across multiple levels. 
The forces resemble a string of chain links extending into supplier and customers tiers. 
Expanding past the primary producer market and first-tier supply and customer market, 
Figure 4 presents a view of a supply chain. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Supply Chain 
(From Lambert, Cooper, & Pagh, 1998) 
 
3. Significance to Government 
Contrasting the five forces’ significance to a firm, government acquisition desires 
highly competitive markets. Similar to a firm’s analysis of only rivalry, government can 
overemphasize competition between firms. Consider the government as a consumer at 
tier three within a highly competitive market. The market appears to have several 
suppliers. Initially, this scenario seems favorable for the government to possess high 
buyer power. A five-forces structural analysis of the broad market may show a low threat 
of new entrants and substitutes. In fact, only a few or single initial suppliers at the 
primary market or first-tier suppliers for a critical component to the end-product may 
exist. In this market, competition at the second- or third-tier customer market may prove 
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fruitless because in this example, the power lies in the primary or supply market. Firms 
possessing this power will capture the most value as measured by price in the market. 
The product value to the end-user is set after production by the primary firm. As 
the product travels through the first tier of customers to consumers, the net value or 
consumer surplus diminishes because price rises. The DoD is a large buyer at various 
tiers. Aggregating DoD requirements at a strategic level as a tier-one customer increases 
value by reducing cost, while end-product value remains the same. The next section will 
discuss the supply chain in more detail. 
C. SUPPLY-CHAIN  
Businesses no longer compete exclusively as individual entities; rather, they 
compete as supply chains, a shift transforming the core of business management 
(Lambert, Cooper & Pagh, 1998). A supply chain is a network of entities directly 
involved in the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances, and/or 
information from a source to a customer (Mentzer et al., 2001). In other words, supply 
chains are networks of activities involving production of goods or services for the 
customer. A supply chain comprises activities that affect a company’s performance—
similar to Porter’s value chain. According to Lambert, Cooper, and Pagh (1998), 
activities are business processes that create specific value to the end-customer. Figure 5 
portrays a supply-chain network, the critical integration of information and product 
flows, plus the strategic supply-chain business processes involved in that network, which 
include purchasing, logistics, marketing and sales, finance, research and development, 
and production (Lambert et al., 1998). The remainder of this section will discuss types of 
supply chains and supply-chain management. 
 
Figure 5.   Supply-chain Network 
(From Lambert et al., 1998) 
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1. Types of Supply-Chain 
There are three basic classifications of supply chains which differ in complexity: 
1) Direct or Basic Supply Chain, 2) Extended Supply Chain, and 3) Ultimate Supply 
Chain. Figure 6 illustrates the different types of supply chains, dictating differing 
amounts of management due to the complexity of each. As the degree of complexity in a 
supply chain increases, the need for management of the supply chain will escalate 
(Menzter et al., 2001). 
 
 
Figure 6.   Supply Chain Types 
(From Menzter et al., 2001) 
a. Direct Supply-Chain 
A direct supply chain is comprised of a company, supplier and a customer. 
The company is dealing with the immediate supplier and customer who are “involved in 
the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances, and information” 
(Menzter et al., 2001). 
b. Extended Supply-Chain 
The extended supply chain includes the same entities and relationships as 
a direct supply chain; however, an extended supply chain adjoins the second-tier supplier 
as well as the immediate or first-tier supplier, and has two tiers of customers. A supply  
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chain that includes all the organizations “involved in the upstream and downstream flows 
of products, services, finances, and information” is called an ultimate supply chain 
(Menzter et al., 2001). 
c. Ultimate Supply-Chain 
In an ultimate supply chain, a company may choose to outsource a supply-
chain function(s) to a third-party logistics (3PL) provider; a 3PL provider specializes in 
performing supply-chain activities between two companies, i.e., between a company and 
its supplier (Mentzer et al., 2001). 
The success of a single firm heavily relies on management’s ability to 
integrate the company’s network of relationships to seek innovation, enhance 
performance, improve quality, and typically lower operating and overhead cost (Lambert, 
2004). The remainder of the section will look at supply-chain management leading to the 
role of purchasing as supply management, linking external suppliers to the internal 
supply chain. 
2. Supply-chain Orientation Versus Supply-chain Management 
At the strategic level, senior leadership in an organization must recognize the 
importance of supply-chain management. However, a firm’s recognition that the tactical 
activities involved in controlling movements in the supply chain have strategic 
implications is not supply-chain management—rather it is called supply-chain orientation 
(Mentzer et al., 2001). Supply-chain management is the actual implementation of actions, 
which are taken in response to the recognition of the strategic implications among the 
supply chain (Mentzer et al., 2001). 
3. Supply-chain Management  
A vital concern for an organization is supply-chain management, which is an 
integrated management approach of the total supply-chain flow from supplier to the end-
user. Supply-chain management’s objective is to maximize competitiveness and 
profitability for a firm and the entire supply-chain network to include the end-customer 
(Lambert et al., 1998). Many experts have different definitions of supply-chain 
management; however, all agree supply-chain management can have a powerful impact 
on an organization by increasing potential cost savings, enhancing customer satisfaction, 
and improving the competitive advantage of all organizations in the supply chain 
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(Mentzer et al., 2001). The implementation of supply-chain management involves 
identifying the members of the supply chain, which member is and processes are crucial 
to integrate, and the level of integration as it applies to each process link (Lambert et al., 
1998).  
As firms make strategic decisions not to perform activities others perform more 
efficiently, the link between suppliers and the internal supply chain becomes more 
critical. Purchasing typically interacts up-channel with suppliers and internally with 
requiring business units (Cooper & Ellram, 1993). By focusing on the buyer-supplier 
relationship, this view of purchasing is becoming supply management, not to be confused 
with supply-chain management, which emphasizes all aspects of delivering the products 
(Chen & Paulraj, 2004). A strategic approach to procurement organizes procurement 
centrally for enterprise-wide effects to feed the internal supply chain by better 
understanding market structures, leveraging purchases, and identifying key suppliers. The 
next section discusses the transition from purchasing to supply management.  
D. PURCHASING AS SUPPLY MANAGEMENT  
The administrative view of purchasing in the 1970s began to shift in the 1980s 
from a tactical to strategic business unit (Carter & Narasimhan, 1996). A study by Carter 
and Narasimhan in 1996 suggests purchasing is just as important as pricing, positioning, 
and product design decisions to a firm’s success. Additionally, the research suggests 
declines in business units’ performance as purchasing decisions become decentralized. 
Conversely, centralized decision systems enable strategic purchasing decisions such as 
partnering, strategic alliances, commodity planning, and integrating procurement strategy 
with corporate strategy (Carter & Narasimhan, 1996).  
According to Burt, Dobler, and Starling (2003), supply management integrates 
and optimizes the entire supply chain. Supply Management is primarily concerned with 
proactively improving processes with the long-term goal of upgrading the competitive 
capability of the firm and the firm’s supply chain. All members of a supply chain can 
reduce cost, improve competitiveness, and increase profitability—if the entire supply 
chain can operate collaboratively and with synchronization (Burt, Dobler & Starling, 
2003). 
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Aspects of a strategic approach to procurement include the view of purchasing as 
supply management and also initiatives such as: strategic sourcing, sourcing strategies, 
and commodity strategies. Strategic sourcing understands markets inside and out to 
increase suppliers’ value (Burt et al., 2003). Sourcing strategies classify purchases by 
assessing supply position to develop an appropriate strategy that mitigates supply 
weaknesses and efficiently uses a company’s buying leverage (Kraljic, 1983). Kraljic 
(1983) presents a portfolio approach to classify goods and services based on their 
strategic importance to the firm and market complexity; this approach is utilized when 
developing sourcing strategies which require varying investments of time and resources. 
From the broad portfolio approach, the procurement agency may tailor strategies for 
individual commodities or commodity strategies. The remainder of this section will 
discuss strategic sourcing, sourcing strategies, and commodity strategies in more detail. 
1. Strategic Sourcing  
Strategic sourcing involves a firm’s decision to take a strategic approach to the 
selection of suppliers (Rendon, 2005). Strategic sourcing is one aspect of a strategic 
approach to procurement which identifies beneficial supplier relationships and core 
competencies within markets and aligns them with the firm’s strategy. As a firm shifts to 
capitalize on suppliers who produce more efficiently, procurement strategy becomes 
more relevant to the firm’s competitive position. Strategic sourcing provides a means to 
integrate procurement strategy with the firm’s overall corporate strategy (Rendon, 2005). 
Strategic sourcing inverts the traditional tactical buying structure. Figure 7 
illustrates the personnel emphasis within a tactical buying and strategic sourcing model. 
A tactical buying organization employs a majority of personnel at lower, decentralized 
levels. This fragments purchases and focuses on short-term, one-time buys—not long-
term, mutually beneficial relationships. Very few employees work at strategic levels to 
leverage and integrate supply chains to benefit the organization. 
Aggregating the firm’s requirements at the strategic level inverts the tactical 
buying structure toward strategic sourcing. A preponderance of personnel focus is on 
market knowledge and supply-base management, while relatively few execute orders. 
This aspect of a strategic approach optimizes the number of suppliers providing specific 
goods or services. By rationalizing the supply base, fewer personnel focus on transaction-
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by-transaction orders, and more focus on developing and integrating the corporate supply 
base and supply chain (Moore, Baldwin, Camm & Cook, 2002). 
 
Figure 7.   Strategic Model 
(From Moore et al., 2002) 
Increasing personnel focus toward market knowledge and supply-base 
management from order processing allows organizations to better understand and manage 
the market structures in which purchases are made. The purchasing organization can 
optimize the number of suppliers by identifying suppliers with beneficial core 
competencies to rationalize the organization’s supply-base relative to the firm’s strategy. 
The next section, sourcing strategies, presents a portfolio approach to better understand 
the organizational importance of products and the product market structures when 
developing strategies. 
2. Sourcing Strategies 
As mentioned previously, to minimize supply vulnerabilities and maximize 
potential buying power, Kraljic presents a portfolio model to develop sourcing strategies. 
The portfolio requires classifying supplies and services as either high or low dependent 
on two factors: 1) internal strategic importance of the product and 2) external complexity 
of the product supply market. Figure 8 portrays the portfolio and the resulting four 
groupings of strategies to source supplies and services: (I) purchasing management, (II) 




classifying supplies and services, the procurement organization is able to develop 
sourcing strategies to both exploit purchasing power and to reduce risk to an acceptable 
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Figure 8.   Kraljic’s Portfolio Model 
(After Kraljic, 1983) 
a. Importance of Purchasing 
Classification of low or high importance depends on the value of the 
product and percentage of total cost. Items with a high percentage of total cost may 
present opportunities to impact overall profitability if their purchases are consolidated 
(Kraljic, 1983). 
b. Complexity of Market 
Analysis of market structure provides insight to supply scarcity, 
technology improvements, material substitution, entry barriers, logistics complexity, and 
monopoly or oligopoly conditions. A complex market presents conditions of high 
supplier power and possibility of supply disruption (Kraljic, 1983). 
c. Purchasing Management—Quadrant I 
Low purchasing importance/low profit impact and low market 
complexity/low supply risk present a purchasing management strategy for noncritical 
items. Noncritical items require low-level strategies to optimize inventory and 
standardize products (Kraljic, 1983). The key strategy is to streamline the process and 
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reduce transaction costs through blanket ordering agreements or purchase cards to 
increase efficiency (Cavinato, Flynn, & Kauffman, 2006). 
d. Materials Management—Quadrant II 
High importance of purchasing/high profit impact and low market 
complexity/low supply risk present a materials-management strategy for leverage items. 
Procurement strategies for leverage items should capitalize on the company’s purchasing 
power to negotiate desirable contract terms and conditions with suppliers (Rendon, 
2005). The key strategy is to maximize the products profit contributions by reducing 
costs of these items (Cavinuto et al., 2006)  
e. Sourcing Management—Quadrant III 
Low importance of purchasing/low profit impact and high market 
complexity/high supply risk present a sourcing-management strategy for bottleneck 
items. Bottleneck items are not particularly valuable to the firm, however market 
complexity presents a risk of shortage. Bottleneck items require a strategy focusing on 
product delivery, volume surplus, and backup plans (Kraljic, 1983).  
f. Supply Management—Quadrant IV 
High importance of purchasing/high profit impact and high market 
complexity/high supply risk present a supply-management strategy for strategic items. 
Strategic items require demand forecasting, in-depth market research, contingency 
planning, and development of long-term supply relationships (Kraljic, 1983). 
Additionally, these long-term relationships may provide opportunities for beneficial 
business integration. Tactics for these strategic items may include certification processes 
to control supplier performance and to monitor continuous improvements (Rendon, 
2005). 
Kraljic’s strategic approach to sourcing provides a practical tool for 
determining the type of procurement strategy for specific products and/or services. 
However, market structures are dynamic, and the portfolio approach requires constant 
monitoring (Rendon, 2005). Market analysis and strategic positioning are critical after 
initial classification. Market analysis systematically reviews the supply market, assessing 
issues such as availability of materials in terms of quality and quantity and the relative 
strength of existing vendors. Strategic positioning develops counterstrategies to mitigate 
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supplier power and other forces within a product market structure (Kraljic, 1983). After 
classifying materials into broad sourcing strategy groupings, commodity strategies can 
optimize the supply base for a specific category of supplies/service (Rendon, 2005). The 
next section discusses commodity strategies as aspects of sourcing strategies for specific 
products.  
3. Commodity Strategy 
Commodity sourcing strategies entail developing a specific sourcing strategy for a 
category or group of supplies and services (Rendon, 2005). Tim Laseter, Vice President 
of Operations Management Group at Booz-Allen Hamilton, Inc., identifies seven 
elements of sourcing strategy in his balanced sourcing model: spend analysis, industry 
analysis, cost and performance analysis, supply-base analysis, business-process 
reintegration, quantification metrics, and implementation strategy (Laseter, 1998). The 
remainder of this section will discuss the key aspects of the balanced sourcing model. 
Note that the first three elements: spend analysis, industry analysis and cost and 
performance analysis, document facts on which to base commodity decisions. The second 
three elements: supply-base analysis, business-process reintegration, and quantification 
metrics represent the core of sourcing strategy—decisions the firm will make. The final 
element, implementation strategy, translates the commodity strategy into opportunity 
(Laseter, 1998). 
a. Spend Analysis 
The spend analysis analyzes all the goods and services an organization 
purchases and plans to purchase in the future across all organizational divisions (Rendon, 
2005). This provides a multidimensional view of the organization’s expenditures: by 
business unit or product lines, by buying location, by supplier, and by sub-commodity. 
Additionally, proper spend analysis should address total acquisition cost, not just 
purchase price (Laseter, 1998). According to Fluor’s CEO, the spend analysis allow firms 
to identify commodities with a high potential savings (Fluor Corporation, 2004). 
b. Industry Analysis 
Industry analysis broadens the commodity team’s perspective of the 
supply chain (Laseter, 1998). As described earlier, market structures are complex supply 
chains. Michael Porter’s five forces is an effective tool with which to map the supply 
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industry. Key aspects to the map are product flow from key supply industries to major 
customer industries and the roles different companies play, such as assembler, 
manufacturer, and distributor (Laseter, 1998). In addition to spend analysis, Fluor uses 
industry analysis to better understand supply markets and suppliers, which it then 
integrates into business processes (Fluor Corporation, 2004). 
c. Cost and Performance Analysis 
Procurement must build an understanding of cost. Cost drivers and 
performance metrics such as quality, technology, timeliness, and flexibility are important 
inputs. One approach for understanding cost is mapping the manufacturing process and 
documenting the quality, technology, timeliness, and flexibility options available 
(Laseter, 1998). 
d. Supply-base Analysis 
Supply-base analysis segments purchases across a set of differentiated 
suppliers. This phase allows procurement to determine the types of suppliers and the roles 
suppliers will play within the firm’s supply-management system (Rendon, 2005). 
Traditional approaches include segmenting purchases by sub-commodity or consuming 
business units. Another approach is to classify purchases by product lifecycle stage. Early 
lifecycle stages may provide future savings through increasing volume or supplier 
learning effects (Laseter, 1998). 
e. Business Process Reintegration 
Suppliers present opportunities for integration of business processes. This 
brings supply chains closer together to eliminate waste (Bernstein, 2006a) and to provide 
opportunities to eliminate low-value activities (Laseter, 1998). 
f. Quantification Metrics 
Savings quantification links commodity strategies to measurable savings. 
Metrics depend largely on the commodity strategy. Widely available and undifferentiated 
commodity purchases may yield high cost savings; cooperative relationships may 
improve quality, and a balance of both practices may benefit both areas for certain 
commodities within certain industries. Finding the right metrics is important to convey 
the resulting commodity strategy to senior organizational leadership (Rendon, 2005). 
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g. Implementation Strategy 
Implementing the plan is the final step of the sourcing strategy. This 
requires translating the plan into a set of tasks that will result in the saving and/or quality 
targets (Rendon, 2005). An implementation plan should define the activities, resources, 
and milestones to achieve the strategic objectives (Laseter, 1998). 
A commodity strategy at tactical levels is simply market research 
performed by several buying organizations. The strategic buying power never 
materializes, conceding power to the market. By aggregating requirements, the buyer 
leverages purchases to realize buyer power. Sourcing strategies enable better and more 
informed commodity decisions for enterprise-wide effects. Strategic sourcing commits 
the firm to identify and integrate beneficial suppliers to the internal supply chain. These 
aspects of a strategic approach begin with the firm’s decision to view purchasing 
strategically. The next section discusses a commercial shift to approach procurement 
strategically, starting from a company leadership perspective. 
E. COMMERCIAL APPLICATION 
Over time, firms’ strategies change to sustain or increase competitive advantage. 
Although strategy considers what a firm does do, it also plays an important role in 
deciding what firms do not do (Coughlan, 2007). In order to influence competitive 
advantage, firms are identifying competencies to remain at the core of business activities 
and non-core activities to source from more efficient suppliers. Such a strategic view of 
business activities increases the importance of taking a strategic approach to procurement 
as a source of competitive advantage to influence product value or quality and reduce 
cost. 
IBM’s now-retired Chief Procurement Officer and Vice President, R. Gene 
Richter, noted the craze of corporate America in the 1990’s as “outsource everything and 
focus on your core competencies”. He continues to emphasize a current trend of 
leveraging and managing outsourced activities of new partners—suppliers of products, 
components, and services. Facing the prospect that each day firms lose billions of dollars 
to inefficiencies in the supply chain increases the focus and need to emphasize 
procurement as a core competency (Nelson, Moody & Stegner, 2001). 
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A firm’s total spend on goods and services as a function of revenue increases as 
the firm’s strategy dictates outsourcing to create an advantage. A strategic approach to 
procurement plays a key role in realizing the advantage the firm’s strategy seeks. Such a 
strategic approach often resides at the core of successful businesses. A strategic approach 
begins with a corporate decision to centralize procurement across business activities, 
which provides a focal organization—planning and executing procurement in accordance 
with the firm’s strategy. The focal procurement organization, strategic sourcing of key 
suppliers, sourcing strategies which mitigate supply risk, and the creation of commodity 
strategies to capture the firm’s buying power each represent an enterprise-wide or 
strategic approach. The remaining portion of this section focuses on commercial 
application of procurement strategy. 
1. IBM 
IBM’s strategy in the mid-1990s transformed purchasing from a tactical focus to a 
strategic focus (Rendon, 2005). Up to the 1990s, IBM produced many of its end-product 
components. IBM was a highly vertical organization, closely guarding information from 
suppliers on how its parts fit within IBM’s overall business strategies. Due to the need for 
secrecy, this lack of supply-chain integration was typical within the computer industry 
during the 1970s. By the mid-1990s, however, several of IBM’s competitors began 
reducing costs by outsourcing and integrating internal capabilities with those of their 
suppliers. Old ways of doing business were preventing IBM from leveraging purchases, 
eliminating process waste, and capitalizing on innovative thinking (Moore et al., 2002). 
IBM’s strategic approach reshaped the scattered collection of purchasing groups 
into a centralized structure (Moore et al., 2002). Centralizing its purchasing function led 
to the creation of 17 commodity councils to leverage corporate buying power. These 
commodity councils allowed IBM to reduce costs and reduce suppliers. Combining 
requirements of all IBM’s divisions and long-term negotiating contracts with suppliers 
yielded lower prices. Commodity councils also enabled IBM to reduce production 
suppliers from 4,900 in 1993 to 50 suppliers—representing 85% of IBM’s $17.1 billion 
production spend in 1999 (Rendon, 2005). 
Strategic sourcing was just one aspect of a larger strategic approach by IBM. Top 
leaders’ vision and commitment to strategic intent, strategic thinking, and complementary 
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actions brought the company to a new level (Moore et al., 2002). The IBM example 
illustrates a few key points.  In the mid-1990s, the computer industry and market 
structure were changing. IBM leadership recognized the need to change strategically, 
which is not an easy task. The solution was a strategic approach to the way procurement 
organized, planned, and leveraged purchases across the enterprise; it integrated key 
suppliers within the internal supply chain. 
2. Dell Computer 
As a very different example, Dell’s business model integrates five key business 
strategies: rapid time to volume, products built-to-order, elimination of reseller markups, 
superior service and support, and low inventory and markup (Kapuscinski, Zhang, 
Carbonneau, Moore & Reeves, 2004). The fit of these activities enable a competitive 
advantage within a highly competitive computer industry—both in terms of rivalry 
between existing manufactures and suppliers such as Microsoft and Intel. The fit of 
purchasing plays a key role within these activities and Dell’s strategy. 
Around 1993, Dell faced a fiscal year net income loss of $76 million, fifty-five 
days of inventory, and $154 million deficit in cash from operations. Dell promised to ship 
computers five days after orders and faced a forty-five day average lead-time for 
purchasing parts. Revamping the supply chain became a core element to Dell’s strategic 
solution. Dell’s focus became continuity of supply and revamping procurement to 
manage purchasing and sourcing. Dell implemented a three-tier structure to manage the 
supply picture. The first, or lowest tier, focuses on commodities on a daily tactical level. 
The second level, execution, plans component sourcing and replenishment. Four times 
the amount of personnel work on this level than on the previous level. At the top tier, six 
times the amount of personnel at the previous level deal with top suppliers (Shah, 2001). 
Dell understands the impact of procurement’s role to increase competitive advantage as a 
function of value to cost. In a 1999 conference call, then-Chief Financial Officer Tom 
Meredith put the importance of expanding beyond the plant floor into the preceding tiers 
of the supply chain into perspective. “Customers see no advantage in a manufacturer 
lowering inventory to six days if 90 days are still in the supply line” (Kapuscinski et al., 
2004).  
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Dell shares ordering information with suppliers once per month to help them 
make good ordering decisions (Kapuscinski et al., 2004). Information becomes a key 
enabler to managing the supply chain. A slinky effect of information within the supply 
chain between end-user purchases, the producer, and suppliers threatens to create supply 
surpluses and shortages. This is due to lack of integration or communication of supply 
chains. Dell’s model places end-users directly in contact with Dell—eliminating the 
customer tiers of the supply chain. However, there is a benefit to Dell and other large 
buyers to placing planned strategic purchases. For instance, the Air Force’s Information 
Technology Commodity Council (ITCC) aggregates otherwise tactical Air Force 
purchases into planned buys. This benefits Dell’s supply projections and supplier 
leverage and creates savings for the Air Force. This paper expounds on ITCC in the next 
section, business transformation. 
3. Deere & Company 
Deere & Co.’s strategic sourcing initiatives won the company Purchasing 
Magazine’s 2001 Medal of Professional Excellence. The award demonstrates a four-year 
turnaround, beginning in 1997, by the firm’s decision to bring the best of modern global 
supply practice to Deere & Co. At the time, Deere bought from over 14,000 active 
suppliers—stemming from a massive move to outsourcing in the 1980’s. Each business 
unit made its own decisions, creating a fragmented supply base. A year later, purchased 
goods and services represented 70% of manufactured cost of products. Implementing 
strategic sourcing became the number-one goal at Deere (Smock, 2006). 
Supplier development and supply-base optimization became key strategies. 
Deere’s strategic sourcing approach classified materials into four categories: unique 
products, critical products, generics and commodities. In 1999, Deere’s annual spend was 
$7.1 billion. Divisional managers retained local buying authority for site-specific major 
components—representing $1.9 billion. Deere divided the remaining spend across 
enterprise divisional teams, enterprise supply-management teams, an indirect strategic 
sourcing team, and a logistics buying team (Smock, 2006). 
The John Deere example illustrates the success of a strategic approach by 
organizing procurement to have enterprise-wide effects through integration with 
corporate strategy—first by segmenting spend to identify categorically what the firm is 
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purchasing. Next, Deere identified areas to leverage purchases for cost savings and 
opportunities for developing relationships with suppliers to increase quality. One 
example is Deere’s $1.4 million annual glove spend—yielding over 424 different types of 
gloves at various prices. The sourcing team set goals to increase safety and quality, price 
consistency, joint buys, and supplier involvement.  Deere saved $490,000, or 35% 
(Smock, 2006). Deere’s strategic approach incorporated the importance of segmenting to 
save and increase quality but also kept local needs under local control. 
4. Fluor Corporation  
Fluor uses strategic procurement to bring greater value to clients and improve 
competitive position. Fluor is one of the largest Engineering, Procurement, and 
Construction (EPC) firms in the world, operating in twenty-five countries across six 
continents. Procurement accounts for two-thirds to three-fourths of the firm’s project 
spend, dictating the need for procurement as a core competency. Fluor describes a 
decentralized procurement approach as “1,000 faces to the supply base.” Global sourcing 
and supply represents Fluor’s philosophy to integrate strategic and tactical functions 
across projects, geographies, industries, and business units. Fluor’s current model adopts 
research from the Construction Industry Institute’s study—identifying significant cost 
savings by integrating procurement during initial engineering efforts. The resulting model 
is Procurement, Engineering, procurement and Construction (PEpC) (Fluor Corporation, 
2004). 
Prior to PEpC, the traditional EPC process integrated procurement of critical 
materials and equipment following a project’s engineering work. Within PEpC, “Big P” 
Procurement focuses on strategic supplier involvement, preceding engineering work.  
Fluor finds moving strategic purchasing (“Big P”) ahead of engineering, and leaving 
nonstrategic purchasing (“small p”) after engineering, the company and clients can save 
between 4% and 10% while achieving shorter lead times (Atkinson, 2007). 
Fluor has four key beliefs critical to achieving its goals and focus on aggressive 
growth: strategic sourcing, enterprise spend management, supplier diversity, and supplier 
integration (Fluor Corporation, 2004). 
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• Strategic sourcing. Fluor selects and manages relationships with proven 
suppliers that serve businesses best. This drives price and nonprice benefits 
toward successful and profitable projects. 
• Enterprise-spend management. Fluor emphasizes understanding the supply 
markets. Enterprise Spend Management Councils identify information to 
capitalize on high potential savings. 
• Supplier diversity. Fluor reaches out to suppliers, ensuring the supplier’s 
information is accessible throughout Fluor’s organizations. 
• Supplier integration. Fluor seeks to integrate supplier’s core competencies 
into projects to benefit engineering. This reduces engineering effort, shortens 
cycle-time and lowers risk. 
 
Fluor’s global sourcing and supply organization manages a $10 billion annual 
spend. Over the past five years, Fluor’s supply base has been reduced from 30,000 
suppliers to an approved-bidders list of 2,000. This includes 150 strategic supplier 
agreements. Jim Scotti, Chief Procurement Officer at Fluor, understands the importance 
of suppliers. One element of the firm’s focus is to eliminate the waste between Fluor and 
suppliers by not only concentrating on Flour’s supply chain, but also on the supply chain 
of the supplier (Bernstein, 2006). Global sourcing and supply has a significant influence 
on Fluor’s success in Iraq. 
As of 2004, over 200 metric tons of air freight and 10,000 cubic tons of sea 
freight had been shipped to Iraq to support $600 million of Fluor contracts in Iraq (Fluor 
Corporation, 2004). Supplier relationships within Iraq are also very important. While Iraq 
has concrete production capacity, the quality is very poor. Often, contractors must place 
their own quality-control personnel within the plants or open their own plants. Fluor’s 
Vice President believes the key is to develop relationships to identify subcontractors with 
the skill mix to accomplish jobs (Gelhausen, 2004). 
5. Analysis of Industry 
Firms’ market structure and strategies differ. Likewise, their strategic approaches 
to procurement differ; however, implementation is driven from the top. This starts with 
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the leaders’ commitment to integrate procurement and corporate strategy. The key is to 
find an approach consistent with the external structure and internal strategy flexible to 
respond in a dynamic environment. 
A centralized core with command and control (C2) over the firm’s purchasing 
decisions can engage in purchasing decisions consistent with the corporate strategy. 
Strategic sourcing initiatives allow integration of external sources and rationalization of 
the current supply base relative to the firm’s strategy. The development of sourcing 
strategies to classify requirements views the supply chain as a dynamic system to 
mitigate risk. Further, commodity strategies can realize the potential buying power of the 
firm. In some cases, a strategic approach will bring firms closer to operational 
effectiveness, as was the case with the computer industry in the late 1990’s. IBM had to 
make a change, as the market structure dictated, to remain competitive. However, 
strategic decisions firms make require alignment by purchasing to capture competitive 
advantage—such as decisions to outsource or to create new product lines. These strategic 
decisions must fit with procurement strategy, thus requiring a strategic approach to 
procurement. 
F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPLICATIONS 
The DoD is transforming to meet the current and future security challenges facing 
the United States. These complex challenges require an agile joint force and flexible and 
responsive financial structure across the full spectrum of military operations in both 
peace and war (Defense Business Transformation Agency, 2006b). In May 2005, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) stressed the importance of agencies initiating 
strategic sourcing to maximize the value of each $300 billion dollars the federal 
government spends on goods and services each year (OMB, 2005). In October 2005, the 
DoD established the Defense Business Transformation Agency (BTA) to execute 
enterprise-level business transformation to meet strategic objectives (Defense Business 
Transformation Agency, 2006a). 
In one sense, a strategic approach to procurement is an old approach to a new 
problem for the DoD. For instance, large DoD system program offices operate under a 
project lifecycle approach. This approach is the Defense Acquisition Management 
Framework, which views programs from concept refinement through disposal. The 
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program office views the entire program from start to finish as is the case in, for example, 
the F-22 system program office. Further, similar program offices cluster within 
specialized centers, such as the Aeronautical Systems Center. The Aeronautical Systems 
Center manages 420 aircraft programs within its portfolio (Aeronautical Systems Center, 
2006). 
As the DoD adapts to current challenges, strategic decisions are made affecting 
what the DoD will source externally rather than provide internally. This provides the 
opportunity for successful acquisition approaches to new challenges facing the DoD to 
improve cost and outcomes such as service and commodity acquisition. The remainder of 
this section will discuss a total lifecycle approach, integrated services approach, and 
commodity approach by the DoD to procure goods and services. 
1. Total Lifecycle Systems Management Approach to Major Systems 
Major defense system acquisition stems from a series of top-down analyses of 
strategic-level guidance, including the National Security Strategy, National Military 
Strategy, Joint Vision 2020, and the Quadrennial Defense Review. The framework for 
these analyses is the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). 
JCIDS ultimately analyzes existing capabilities and future weapon systems needs 
associated with capability gaps and the resulting risks. The collective analysis produces 
an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and entry into concept refinement, the initial 
stage of the Defense Acquisition Management Framework (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2006). According to DoD Directive 5000.1, the Defense Acquisition 
Management System is the process by which the DoD provides effective, affordable, and 
timely systems to users (United States Department of Defense, 2003a). Pre-acquisition 
presents the first meaningful opportunity to influence weapon system supportability and 
affordability by balancing threat scenarios, technology opportunities, and operational 
requirements (Defense Acquisition University, 2006). 
The program manager (PM) has the ultimate program responsibility as the system 
lifecycle manager responsible for effective and timely acquisition and sustainment. Total 
lifecycle systems management (TLCSM) is the implementation, management, and 
oversight, by the designated PM, of all activities associated with the acquisition, 
development, fielding, sustainment, and disposal of a DoD weapon or material system 
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across its lifecycle (Defense Acquisition University, 2006). DoD Directive 5000.1 states 
that PMs should begin planning for operations and support and the estimation of total 
ownership costs as early as possible. Additionally, the PM should consider supportability 
throughout the program lifecycle (United States Department of Defense, 2003a). Figure 9 
illustrates a total lifecycle systems-management view of the Defense Acquisition 









Figure 9.   TLCSM View of the Defense Acquisition Management Framework 
(After Defense Acquisition University, 2006) 
 
The Defense Acquisition Management Framework under the TLCSM umbrella 
encompasses the PM’s duty to the lifecycle of a defense system. Under this approach, the 
PM is responsible for program cost, schedule, and performance reporting to the milestone 
decision authority (MDA). The MDA has full program responsibility and authorizes entry  
Defense Acquisition Management Framework 
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through milestones, triangles above framework: A, B, C, into subsequent program stages 
(United States Department of Defense, 2003a). The next section will discuss an old 
approach to a new application, service contracts. 
2. Program Approach to Service Contracts 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2007) found over the past decade 
that the DoD is increasingly relying on service contractors to provide a wide range of 
services. Obligations on service contracts have risen 72% from 1996 to 2005, from $82.3 
billion to $141.2 billion respectively. Services include management, maintenance, 
information technology, and security. An example is the US Army’s award of a $733 
million security contract, supporting 57 installations, resulting from personnel shortages 
stemming from the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The DoD’s collective service 
acquisition portfolio represents 20% of total spend and now exceeds the amount the 
Department spends on supplies and equipment, including major weapon systems (United 
States General Accountability Office, 2007). 
The DoD traditionally views service acquisition under a different framework from 
defense system acquisition, partly due to lower risk. The GAO views DoD service 
acquisition as fragmented and uncoordinated, as the responsibility is spread across 
individual service commands, program offices, and field base-support offices. This 
creates little visibility or control at the service and defense department level. The GAO 
identifies three key success factors: obtaining the right service, at the right price, in the 
right manner. Enabling these key factors at the strategic level is leadership, processes, 
and information necessary to mitigate risks, leverage buying power, and managing 
outcomes. This means the organization must understand the volume, sources, portfolios, 
and trends of the services; it must then ensure requirements are valid, purchased properly, 
and performed with minimum risk and maximum efficiency (United States General 
Accountability Office, 2007). 
The 2002 National Defense Authorization Act requires establishment of a 
management structure for the acquisition of services. DoD Instruction 5000.2, Operation 
of the Defense Acquisition System, addresses the acquisition of services in enclosure 
eight, stating all service acquisitions shall use a strategic approach that includes  
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developing a picture of the DoD’s spend on services, an enterprise-wide approach to 
procuring services, and developing new ways of doing business (United States 
Department of Defense, 2003b). 
An example of a strategic approach to services is Air Combat Command’s 
Acquisition Management Integration Center (AMIC). AMIC is a service program office. 
Program managers work side-by-side with contracting officers, along with other 
functional expertise: logistics, civil engineers, communications, and quality assurance. 
AMIC’s approach applies a large, defense program-management style to the acquisition 
of services (AMIC, 2007). 
3. Commodity Council Approach  
Defense-wide Strategic Sourcing (DWSS) analyzes spend to more efficiently and 
effectively acquire services and commodities (Defense Business Transformation Agency, 
2006a). The theme for the acquisition of commodities is similar to services: leveraging 
buying power to obtain goods at better terms and conditions over the product lifecycle 
(United States Department of Defense, 2005). Figure 10 illustrates the systematic 
approach DWSS uses to incorporate enterprise spend analysis, supplier relations 
development, demand management, and stakeholder requirements into the sourcing 




Figure 10.   Defense-wide Strategic Sourcing Overview 
(From OSD, 2005) 
Figure 11 illustrates the Strategic Sourcing Directors Board (SSDB) as the 
strategic apex of DWSS initiatives. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
presides over the SSDB and is the Department’s single point of contact for all federal 
strategic sourcing initiatives (United States Department of Defense, 2006). As shown in 
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Figure 11, each component has a Strategic Sourcing Coordination Group (SSCG) to 
execute strategic sourcing initiatives within its respective components. The SSDB is 
made up of the SSCG leadership from each component. This structure facilitates strategic 
decision-making and administers the strategic sourcing program across DoD (United 
States Department of Defense, 2006). Particular examples of strategic sourcing initiatives 
from each component will be identified in the remainder of this section. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Strategic Sourcing Directors Board (SSDB) 
(From OSD, 2005) 
a. Department of the Army 
The Army Material Command (AMC) plans to launch a joint service 
Purchasing and Supply Management (PSM) pilot program at the Army’s Aviation and 
Missile Command (United States Department of Defense, 2006). The program will focus 
on depot-level reparables (DLR) for helicopter rotor blades and drive-train equipment. In 
addition, the program will have a cross-functional commodity team as well as a supplier 
management team. All these initiatives will enable AMC to transform from a tactical 
transaction-oriented command to a strategic supply-chain management organization 
(United States Department of Defense, 2006). 
b. Department of the Navy 
In 2005, the Department of the Navy employed a commodity strategy for 
cellular and data requirements (United States Department of Defense, 2006). The Navy 
centralized the requirements by issuing Department-wide contracts and mandating the 
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contracts’ uses for all the Navy’s cellular phone services, to include personal data 
assistants (United States Department of Defense, 2006). Additionally, the Navy is 
developing further commodity strategies for office supplies and furniture. These 
strategies will enable the Navy to standardize ordering processes, take advantage of lower 
prices resulting from economies of scale and to provide business intelligence on demand 
(United States Department of Defense, 2006). 
c. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
The DLA also developed a strategic sourcing transformation venture, 
Supplier Relationship Management. This initiative transforms the DLA’s current state of 
managing supplies to overseeing suppliers as a method to improve service to the ultimate 
customer, the warfighter. The DLA has formed long-term relationships with critical 
suppliers to collaborate and integrate information which is mutually beneficial (United 
States Department of Defense, 2006). 
d. Department of the Air Force 
The Air Force utilizes a strategic management framework. The Air 
Force’s strategic management framework consists of a strategic plan, balanced scorecard, 
contracting strategy council, and planning, programming and budget system. This 
framework helps the Air Force to decide on the best utilization of its limited resources 
and to measure successful performance. Figure 12 depicts the Air Force strategic 
sourcing process, which enables the Air Force to strategically source through a spend 
analysis and through continuous monitoring of its strategy (Benza, 2007). The Air Force 
has implemented a number of strategic initiatives, including commodity councils. The 




Figure 12.   Air Force Strategic Sourcing Process 
(From Benza, 2007) 
One example of commodity council success is the Air Force ITCC. The 
ITCC is a centralized, cross-functional organization which formulates Air Force-wide 
buying, acquisition, and lifecycle support strategies to fill IT requirements. By 
centralizing planning, the ITCC manages Air Force spend to decrease total cost of 
ownership, decrease lead times, and increase Air Force purchasing flexibility. The 
organization integrates customers and suppliers to drive an enterprise-wide IT strategy 
(ITCC, 2007). The success of ITCC speaks for itself. In August of 2003, a $7.5 million 
award to Dell for 12,500 computers saved enough for the purchase of an additional 2,500 
computers above the original planned procurement. In December of the same year, 
14,863 desktops and 763 laptops for three different major commands brought a $4 
million savings (Rendon, 2005). 
The DoD is implementing many strategic initiatives to enhance warfighter 
support. Business transformation initiatives enable the Department to reduce operating 
costs enterprise-wide, become a better steward of taxpayers’ money, and gain the ability 
to rapidly access information to make strategic decisions (Defense Business 
Transformation Agency 2006). Past practices, such as total lifecycle approach to major 
systems, were discussed in this section, along with current initiatives such as program 
approaches to services and the use of commodity councils to identify beneficial  
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opportunities. The optimal sourcing strategy varies according to the level of cross overlap 
with DoD and the importance of the mission, as depicted in Figure 13 (United States 





Figure 13.    Approaches Based on Spend Characteristics 
(From OSD, 2005) 
G. SUMMARY  
This chapter examined strategy and the ability to sustain a competitive advantage. 
Strategy is creating a unique and sustainable competitive position though trade-offs, 
effective value-chain execution, and a strategic fit between all the activities (Porter, 
1996). Market structure analysis was discussed to examine external factors a firm must 
consider when developing a strategy. The next concept discussed was supply chain and 
supply-chain management. A supply chain is a network of activities involved in 
producing the goods or services to the customer. The magnitude of supply-chain 
management directly relates to the complexity of the supply chain. The subsequent 
section discussed the evolution of purchasing to supply management. Supply 
management is a strategic approach to purchasing. Next, commercial strategic approaches 
to procurement were discussed; the researchers then provided examples to illustrate how 
a firm’s purchasing decisions must align with its overall strategy. Finally, the chapter 
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analyzed DoD strategic approaches through such initiatives as total the lifecycle 
approach, integrated services approach, and commodity approach. 
The impact of purchasing as a source of competitive advantage is relative to its 
strategic importance and fit within the larger context of supply-chain management and 
overall corporate and military strategy. Strategic approaches begin with corporate or 
military acknowledgment of procurements’ strategic importance. From this realization, 
leaders can formulate a strategic approach which can centralize spend for an enterprise-
wide procurement organization and integration within the supply chain and strategy. The 
procurement organization’s focus can become developing sourcing strategies to realize 
the full potential of spend to influence cost and quality relative to overall strategic 
requirements. The procurement organization achieves this harmony by tailoring service 
and commodity strategies commensurate with the importance of the product and 
complexity of the product market. 
As the prior chart depicts, cross-DoD collaboration results in best practices in the 
acquisition of goods and services aligning with DoD requirements and strategy. The next 
chapter reviews contingency contracting to understand how a strategic approach may 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
43  
III. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
A contracting officer’s duty is to enter into, administer, and terminate contracts in 
the interest of the United States Government in accordance with the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) (FAR, 2007). A fundamental difference between a contracting officer 
and a contingency contracting officer is the physical environment and challenges in 
which a contingency contracting officer operates to acquire goods and services. A 
contingency is an emergency involving military forces stemming from natural disasters, 
terrorists, subversions, or military operations (Defense Acquisition University, 2005a). 
Examples include recovery from Hurricane Katrina in August of 2005, terrorist attacks 
on September 11th, 2001, and both OEF and OIF. 
The acquisition environment of a contingency is dependent on whether the 
contingency is declared or undeclared. This explicit difference dictates the restrictiveness 
of the law, where declared is less restrictive. According to Title 10 United States Code 
(USC) a declared contingency requires one of two actions listed below to occur. Non-
declared contingencies are all other DoD operations not mentioned below (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2005a).  
• Designated by the Secretary of Defense when members of the Armed Forces 
may become involved in military actions against an enemy of the US 
• Declared by the President or Congress when members of the uniformed forces 
are called to active duty (a reserve component mobilization) under Title 10, 
USC, or any provision of law during a declared war or national emergency. 
 
The formal declaration of a contingency is a major event shaping the contracting 
environment. A declared contingency increases the responsive Simplified Acquisition 
Threshold (SAT) within the FAR from $100,000 to $1,000,000. Additionally, the use of 
Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP), within the FAR Part 13, increases from 
$5,500,000 to $11,000,000 under a declared contingency (Contracting Laboratory, 2007). 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) defines contingency contracting as 
“direct support to tactical and operational forces engaging in the full spectrum of armed 
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conflict and military operations other than war, both domestic and overseas” (2005c). 
Contingency operations are landscapes consisting of the element of immediate risk to 
human life or significant national interests (Defense Acquisition University, 2005a). 
This chapter on contingency contracting consists of three sections: Stages of a 
Contingency, Geographic Combatant Commands, and Contracting in Contingency 
Operations. Each section will build specificity toward understanding the contingency 
environment, the contingency planning process (specifically, the contingency contracting 
support plan), and the current contingency contracting situation in Iraq—illustrating the 
need for a strategic approach to contingency contracting operations in the future. A 
strategic approach will attempt to plan requirements and develop strategic sourcing 
initiatives, sourcing strategies, and commodity strategies across geographic areas to 
posture future contingency contracting support for geographic combatant commanders 
(who conduct military operations within unstable contingency environments relying on 
the individual services’ contract authority).  
A. STAGES OF CONTINGENCY 
Prior to discussing the stages of a contingency in detail, it is important to 
understand the types of contract support existing within the stages of contingency 
contracting operations. There are multiple heads of contracting activities (HCA) across 
multiple military organizations, and multiple types of contracted support are utilized in 
joint operations because of the wide array of system support, external support and theater 
support. Systems support contracts maintain much of service components’ equipment, 
awarded through and under the contract authority of the stateside systems program office. 
External support contracts, such as the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP), provide significant logistic and non-logistic support through contracts issued 
by the services’ contract authority, normally during peacetime. Theater support contracts 
are issued by deployed contingency contracting officers to support in-theater customer 
requirements under the services’ authority (United States Joint Forces Command, 2007). 
The amount of support each provides to facilitate contingency operations depends on the 
magnitude of the contingency. 
According to the DAU Contingency Contracting Course material, contingency 
contracting operations may be segmented into four phases: mobilization/initial 
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deployment, buildup, sustainment, and termination/redeployment (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2005a). These are local tactical stages and run in conjunction with many other 
base buildups or relief efforts across an area or region. For example, the four uniform 
services and other DoD agencies, such as DLA, Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA), and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), will each conduct 
contracting activities to support their respective efforts. The service and agency efforts 
further fragment to smaller, local contracting activities under their respective service or 
agency’s contracting authority. Figure 14 illustrates the fragmented service support 
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Figure 14.   Four Stages of a Contingency Operation 
 
 
The remainder of this section discusses the four stages in greater detail, drawing 
heavily from the DAU’s contingency contracting course text. In relation to the figure 
above, notice the focal aspects of each stage. A strategic approach will later attempt to 
capture the focal areas prior to the onset of a contingency by jointly organizing the 
services’ contract support to create an effective contracting command-and-control (C2) 
structure. 
1. Mobilization/Initial Deployment 
Ideally, this stage runs the first 30-45 days of a contingency. Extreme operation 
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the unit’s priority of needs to support troop arrival is the contingency contracting 
officer’s number-one priority (Defense Acquisition University, 2005a). Examples of 
critical requirements during this stage include: 
• Food Service and Water 
• Billeting, Bath, Laundry, Utility, Refuse and Sanitation Service 
• Equipment Rental, Transportation, and Ground Fuel 
• Interpreters and/or Guides 
 
Flexibility by the contingency contracting officer is paramount. However, 
urgency and responsiveness often create less-than-optimal arrangements without a large 
degree of flexibility. These arrangements can plague and prolong the future stages. 
2. Buildup 
The length of buildup directly correlates to the prior stages proactive measures to 
support and bed-down the main body of deploying troops. These troops will require 
additional volumes of service (Defense Acquisition University, 2005a). If contracts in the 
prior stage consider additional future troop arrival, the volume should adjust seamlessly. 
If the contracts in the prior stage were reactive to meet the immediate need without 
incorporating proactive measures, they may become a liability. The contracting officer 
will either need to start over, ideally considering future flexibility, or negotiate at a severe 
disadvantage.  
Aside from assessing the flexibility of contracts’ responsiveness to meet basic life 
support, additional requirements to meet effectiveness include: heavy equipment, 
construction material, horizontal construction, office equipment/furniture, quality of 
life/morale, welfare and recreation (TVs, VCRs and DVDs, gym and sports equipment). 
In conjunction with these acquisitions, the contracting officer becomes part of a 
contracting office which must focus on the following prior to sustainment (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2005a): 
• Establishing C2 over local contracting and contracting-support personnel 
• Establishing a reliable and responsive local vendor base 
• Establishing flexible and efficient tools to meet common base requirements, 
such as Blanket Purchase Agreements 
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3. Sustainment 
The shift to sustainment dictates comfortably meeting the everyday needs of 
forces. This stage will run until contingency termination and redeployment. If not done in 
prior stages, sustainment requires contracting to proactively view the contingency. The 
contracting activity will transition to more permanent facilities and equipment, along with 
long-term contracts, should the contingency dictate. The local contracting framework will 
deepen, from the prior stage, to incorporate the following measures (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2005a): 
• Consolidate requirements into long-term contracts, where possible, to achieve 
economies of scale, reduce cost, and mitigate risk 
• Improve documentation and internal controls 
• Increase competition and vendor base from outside local area 
• Plan for transition to termination/redeployment 
 
4. Termination and Redeployment 
The purpose of this stage is either to redeploy or forward-deploy. The volume and 
scope of the contracts reverts back to the levels of the initial stage. Contracting will have 
two main objectives (Defense Acquisition University, 2005a): 
• Procure new requirements, such as: packing, crating, and freighting service, 
construction and wash racks for vehicles, and any necessary transportation 
• Terminate and close-out existing contracts and agreements 
 
This stage relies directly on the choices made in the prior stages. Similar to how 
buildup relies on flexibility to increase service volume, termination and redeployment 
depends on the prior stages’ assessment of troop reduction. Although contingencies are 
comprised of a wide array of unknowns, the prior stages’ decisions magnify.   
Contracting must assess all government liabilities. This includes settling all 
claims and ratifications or commitments by unauthorized individuals. Contracting  
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officers ensure proper contract documentation exists to prove payments and return of any 
rental equipment. At this point, contracts can successfully close (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2005a). 
5. Four Stages’ Summary and Analysis 
The DoD’s theater contingency contracting requirements fragment tactically for 
the uniform services to execute. Tactical service operations further fragment contracting 
operations to sub-units or regional offices. Seamless and fluid transition between stages 
largely depends on the decisions made in the initial stage. Reasoning and planning done 
prior to the onset of the contingency will dictate whether the decisions are reactive or 
proactive. A lack of planning and information exchange can prolong the initial two stages 
and create claims stemming from inadequate policy and documentation, plaguing the 
termination and redeployment phase. 
A strategic approach would emphasize joint integration of procurement strategy to 
complement operational strategy. Contingency operation plans are extensive. Reducing 
organic capability requires integrating contracting strategy with operational strategy to 
proactively view this theoretical framework. This integration may engage factors 
affecting each stage by taking a strategic approach to contingency contracting prior to 
mobilization. A strategic approach emphasizes the need to address the focal aspects of 
each stage prior to the onset of the contingency. One area in which to address and apply a 
strategic approach is the contingency contracting support plan (CCSP). The next section 
investigates this issue, beginning with a discussion and introduction to combatant 
commands, where the responsibility for geographic control of forces falls. 
B. COMBATANT COMMANDS 
As it has since the beginning of the republic, our nation continues transforming to 
better organize defense. The US military adapts constantly to organizational training, 
equipping, and commanding issues of world-wide military forces during peace and war 
(Lederman, 1999). The theme of reorganization oscillates between functional service 
control and geographic control of forces. Defense reorganization, occurring in the 1940s, 
placed geographic control under regional combatant commanders (Cole, Poole, Schnabel, 
Watson, & Webb, 2003). However, over the past decade, geographic commanders 
increasingly rely on contractors to meet many logistical and operational support needs 
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during combat operations and other missions. Attributing to this are reductions in the size 
of the military, increases in the number and size of operations, and increasingly 
sophisticated weapons systems (United States General Accountability Office, 2006). This 
presents a new twist to the functional-versus-geographic-control debate as combatant 
commands do not have authority under Title 10 U.S.C. to enter into contracts. This 
section focuses on four sub-sections, which identify military reorganization into the 
current combatant command and contingency contracting structure: 
• Military Reorganization and Combatant Commands 
• Current Regional Combatant Command Structure 
• Contingency Planning 
• Combatant Commands and Contingency Contracting  
 
1. Military Reorganization and Combatant Commands 
During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, division of warfare along the 
waters’ edge meant Army and Navy forces could, for the most part, operate 
independently. The Revolutionary War, War of 1812, Civil War, and Spanish American 
War of 1898 demonstrated examples of both cooperation and dissention between the two 
services. World War I would mark the last war of almost complete service autonomy as 
the airplane would create an overlap in capability and an inter-service debate (Lederman, 
1999). 
a. Unified Command Plan 
The global scale of military joint operations required a change away from 
autonomous service operations to ensure combat efficiency. The theme of reorganizing 
became a shift from functional to geographical command during regional military 
operations. In 1942, prior to World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt unofficially 
created the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to parallel the British Chiefs of Staff to direct 
the war effort. This was a major change to the US military’s command structure 
(Lederman, 1999). In December 1946, after the war and due to the Navy’s dissatisfaction 
with an ambiguous and unsatisfactory divide in command within the Pacific between 
Army General Douglas MacArthur (Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific) and 
50  
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz (Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet), President Truman 
approved the first Unified Command Plan under control of the JCS (Cole et al., 2003). 
Theater commanders now oversaw forces from each service within 
regional geographic areas. Service-specific forces fell under component commands 
within the unified commands. The service component commands reported to their 
respective service for training and equipping while receiving operational orders from the 
newly created unified commands (Lederman, 1999). 
b. National Security Act of 1947 
The passage of the National Security Act of 1947 created the National 
Military Establishment (NME) with a civilian Secretary of Defense to oversee the 
military services, including the newly created Air Force. The Secretary of Defense 
became the principle assistant to the President on national security matters. However, the 
Act did not define the NME as an executive department like the individual executive 
service departments. Additionally, the Act formally recognized the JCS and charged them 
with formulating plans and unified commands around the globe (Lederman, 1999). 
In 1949, amendments to the Act took a huge step toward unification of 
services. The NME became an executive-level department, the DoD. The services 
became departments within the new DoD under the direction, authority, and control of 
the Secretary. Congress also created the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to 
preside over and assist the Joint Chiefs from the Army, Navy, and Air Force to provide 
military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. Fearful of creating a single 
military commander, Congress forbade the Chairman from voting and did not allow 
authority over the JCS or services. Further, Congress rejected President Truman’s request 
that the CJCS serve as principal military advisor (Lederman, 1999). 
c. Eisenhower Reorganization of 1953 and 1958 
President Eisenhower continued military transformation through two 
reorganizations. First, in 1953, the chain of command was organized to run from the 
President to the Secretary of Defense, then to the service secretaries, and then to the 
chiefs of each service. In 1958, the chain was altered to eliminate the secretaries and 
chiefs and run directly from the President to the Secretary of Defense and then to the 
Commanders of the Unified Commands. However, the JCS would serve as advisors to 
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the Secretary of Defense, issuing orders in the name of the Secretary of Defense; and the 
CJCS received voting rights as a “first among equals,” not dominant JCS figure 
(Lederman, 1999). This would prove the final major reorganization until 1986. 
d. Pre-1986 Reorganization 
Two major problems existed in defense organization.  First, the chiefs of 
staff were dual-hatted. In the centralized decision system, each chief’s operational and 
budgetary responsibility closely aligned to his service, not to the DoD. This problem 
weakened unified combatant commanders’ control. The service component commands 
reported to two chains of command: 1) to the combatant commanders for operations and 
2) to the services for training and equipping. Service component commanders had tight 
ties to the services, weakening the unified combatant commands charged with regional 
warfighting responsibility. The second major problem was a weak Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff—contributing to unclear and indecisive JCS advice to civilian leadership 
(Lederman, 1999). 
Prior to 1986, a bombing of Marine barracks in Lebanon and a 
disorganized Granada invasion would catalyze another reorganization debate. These 
operations revealed a confused chain of command to the field, affecting joint operations 
and causing a lack of JCS influence on military policy (Lederman, 1999). 
e. Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act outlines eight objectives in reorganizing DoD: 
to strengthen civilian authority, to improve military advice provided to the President, the 
National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear 
responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for 
the accomplishment of the missions assigned to those commands, to ensure that the 
authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully 
commensurate to accomplish assigned missions, to increase attention to the formulation 
of strategy and contingency planning, to provide more efficient use of defense resources, 
to improve joint officer management policies, to enhance the effectiveness of military 
operations (Goldwater-Nichols, 1986). Reorganization since the original Unified 




Figure 15.    Chain of Command and Control 
(From United States Joint Forces Command, 2001) 
  
2. Current Geographical Combatant Command Structure 
The current Unified Command Plan delegates geographical Combatant 
Commanders’ area of responsibility (AOR). Training and equipping of forces remains a 
service responsibility, while command during regional military operations falls under 
geographical COCOMs. Currently, there are nine unified commands: four functional and 
five geographical commands. The functional commands include US Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM), US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), US Joint 
Forces Command (USJFCOM), and US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The five 
geographical commands are US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), US Southern 
Command (USSOUTHCOM), US European Command (USEUCOM), US Pacific 
Command (USPACOM), and US Central Command (USCENTCOM), as shown in 
Figure 16. Additionally, on February 6th, 2007, President Bush consolidated command of 
Africa into the sixth geographical COCOM, US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) 
(Wood, 2006). Portions of Africa are currently within three commands: USEUCOM, 
USCENTCOM, and USPACOM. 
53  
 
Figure 16.   Combatant Command Structure 
(From Defense-Link, 2007) 
 
Service Component Commands fall under and receive direction from the 
geographical COCOM. Figure 17 outlines the integration of supporting commands within 
USCENTCOM as an example. The next section focuses on constructing military 
operation plans (OPLAN) for execution by the COCOMs. The section following 
contingency planning introduces the contingency contracting support plan within the 
OPLAN and reintroduces USCENTCOM and investigates contingency planning leading 





Figure 17.    Service Component Commands 
(From US CENTAF Brief, Air Combat Command Contracting Conference, 2007) 
 
3. Contingency Planning 
National security is among the fundamental national purposes the American 
people embedded in the constitution. The armed forces of the US provide the common 
constitutional imperative of common defense. Additionally, these forces participate in 
operations other than combat to advance and defend national interests (United States 
Joint Forces Command, 2000). The process of planning a joint operation produces a 
contingency plan, or OPLAN, for military action. The plan aligns with the President’s 
national strategy, funding resources from Congress, and task assignments by the CJCS 
(Defense Acquisition University, 2005b). 
This section introduces contingency planning, specifically by providing a process 
overview, an explanation of national security planning process, deliberate planning, crisis 
action planning (CAP) and joint operation planning and execution system (JOPES). This 
section should broaden or reinforce the fundamental planning process and introduce the 
CCSP within an OPLAN. 
a. Process Overview 
Figure 18 illustrates the players within the planning process. The upper 
cone of the pyramid consists of executive-level agencies.  The National Command 
Authority (NCA) rests at the apex of the chart. This level consists of the President and the 
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Secretary of Defense setting the overall strategic direction of the US military (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2005b). The Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) 
rests at the bottom two-thirds of the chart. The JPEC consists of training, preparation, 
movement, employment, support, and sustainment of forces in theater operations by 
commands and agencies. The next section will discuss the National Security Planning 
Process. 
 
Figure 18.   Participants in the Planning Process 
(From DAU, 2005b) 
b. National Security Planning Process 
Figure 19 describes the four interrelated aspects of national security 
planning processes: the National Security Council System, Joint Strategic Planning 
System (JSPS), Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES), and 
JOPES. This section will briefly discuss each area of the planning process and begin to 
focus on the JOPES. After discussing this aspect of the planning process, the study will 




Figure 19.   National Security Planning Processes 
(From United States Joint Forces Command, 2000) 
Note: PPBS has been changed to PPBES 
The NSC consists of the President, as head, and includes the Vice 
President. Statutory members include the Secretaries of State and Defense, CJCS for 
professional military advice, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency as 
intelligence advisor. The NSC serves as the President’s principle forum on national 
security and foreign policy matters (United States Joint Forces Command, 2000). 
PPBES is chaired by the Secretary of Defense. The primary objective of 
this program is resource allocation to the armed services to execute aspects of the 
National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. The PPBES enables military 
services and selected commands and agencies to develop and sustain military capabilities 
(United States Joint Forces Command, 2000). 
The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the connecting link between 
COCOM and national planning, the basis for campaign and operation plans, the formal 
system through which the CJCS coordinate with members of the JCS and COCOMs to 
provide military advice to the NCA and recommendations to the PPBES. The JSPS 
produces the National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan to 
provide military plans, strategy, guidance, forces, resource requirements, and allocations 
necessary to carry out Presidential directives. JSPS also evaluates military capabilities, 
along with adequacy and risk with current programs and budgets (United States Joint 
Forces Command, 2000). 
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JOPES is the principle DoD system for translating policy decisions into 
operational plans and orders to effectively employ US forces. JOPES consists of 
deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP) within a single architecture (United 
States Joint Forces Command, 2000). This reduces time-refining results of deliberate 
planning readily accessible to planners in CAP during a crisis (Defense Acquisition 
University, 2005b). Figure 20 depicts the JOPES architecture—incorporating both the 
deliberate and crisis-planning processes, which are described below the figure. The 
remainder of this section briefly discusses deliberate planning and CAP. 
 
 
Figure 20.   Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Processes 
(From DAU, 2005b) 
 
c. Deliberate or Peacetime Planning 
Deliberate planning anticipates future contingencies in which prudence 
drives a planning requirement. The process takes place when time permits total 
participation of the commanders and staffs of the JPEC. Developing and coordinating the 
plan among commanders, agencies, and services for review by the Joint Staff can take 





d. Crisis Action Planning (CAP) 
CAP responds to crises threatening US interests by considering use of 
military force. In contrast to deliberate planning, CAP responds to situations developing 
very quickly. The CAP process parallels deliberate planning, but is more flexible in 
reacting to developing requirements. This process promotes a rapid flow of information 
and executable courses of action between the NCA and combatant commanders (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2005b). Figure 21 summarizes the joint planning process that 
leads to an operation order (OPORD). 
 
 
Figure 21.   Joint Planning Summary 
(From DAU, 2005b) 
JOPES automated data processing turns an unacceptably slow, 
unresponsive, inflexible, deliberate process for planners to develop, analyze, refine, 
review and maintain joint operations and supporting plans into an appropriately dynamic 
system. Figure 22 details the components of a JOPES OPLAN that planners may tailor in 
the event of a crisis. Annex D of the OPLAN, Logistics, incorporates contracting via the 
contingency contracting support plan (Defense Acquisition University, 2005b). The next 
section will discuss COCOMs and contingency contracting. 
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Figure 22.   Components of a JOPES OPLAN 
(From DAU, 2005b) 
4. Combatant Commands and Contingency Contracting 
Contingency contracting support to geographical COCOMs becomes interesting 
as geographic control of forces remains, but the amount of organic forces shrinks. 
Geographical COCOMs are the authority for military operations within their area of 
responsibility, but rely on increasing amounts of contract planning and support to fill the 
gap between decreasing military capability and increasing numbers of operations and 
weapon-system sophistication. This is the new twist to geographic control of forces—a 
situation in which individual services possess authority to enter into contracts under Title 
10 U.S.C. Depending on the size, location, scope, and need for joint integration, there are 
three main contracting organizational options: 1) service component support to own 
forces, 2) designation of lead agency, 3) joint contracting command (United States Joint 
Forces Command, 2007). This section focuses on the contingency contracting support 
plan and the effect of COCOMs relying on individual services’ Title 10 USC contracting 




a. Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) 
The supported commander directs the preparation and submission of 
supporting plans during the final stage of the deliberate planning process. A CCSP 
outlines plans and procedures in response to disaster relief, rapid deployment logistics 
support, and support of deployments of US or allied forces outside of the continental US. 
A CCSP ensures contracting receives proper attention within logistics plans (Defense 
Acquisition University, 2005b). The DAU outlines what a CCSP should establish: 
• Command-and-control relationships 
• Location and structure of contracting offices and sub-offices 
• Procedures for appointing, training, and employing ordering officers, 
contracting officer representatives, disbursing agents, and government 
purchase cards 
• Policy on ratifications and claims 
• Manpower, equipment and supplies for contract support and deployment 
sequence 
• Types of supplies, services, and construction support customers require, along 
with prioritization or control of scarce commodities or services 
• Procedures for defining, validating, processing and satisfying requirements 
• Procedures for closing-out contracts and redeployment 
• Security requirements for contracting and contractor personnel 
• Specific statutory/regulatory constraints within the environment 
• Concept of contracting operations synchronizing with the support plan 
• Description and assessment of host nation agreements, customs, laws, culture, 
language, religion, and business practices impacting contracting operations 
• Environmental considerations impacting contracts (within Annex L) 
 
Normally, the CCSP is developed by the geographic command J-4 staff, 
logistics, and assisted by the lead service, if designated. Additionally, each service 
component should publish a CCSP that closely follows that of the geographic support 
plan (United States Joint Forces Command, 2007). If these aspects exist within a 
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contingency contracting support plan, a strategic approach to contingency contracting 
may alleviate the problems within the standard stages of a contingency, as discussed 
earlier. Figure 23 shows the integration of supporting plans in relation to the OPLAN.  
 
Figure 23.   Supporting Plans 
(From DAU, 2005b) 
b. Title 10, USC and obligation authority 
The USC consolidates and codes the law of the US; Title 10 within that 
code addresses armed forces (Title 10 USC, 2004). As discussed earlier, Title 10 USC 
vests contracting authority within the services and support agencies, not geographic 
COCOMs. However, USSOCOM and USTRANSCOM, two functional unified 
commands, do have contracting authority. Title 10 USC Section 164 (c) (A) assigns the 
following powers and responsibilities to geographic COCOMs (Title 10 USC, 2004): 
 
Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the 
authority, direction, and control of the commander of a combatant 
command with respect to the commands and forces assigned to that 
command include the command functions of—(A) giving authoritative 
direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out 
missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over 
all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. 
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This statement aligns with the geographic control of forces supporting COCOMs. The 
last sentence states authoritative direction of all aspects of military operations, which 
includes logistics. Figure 24 is an organizational chart of USCENTCOM, including 
logistics—in which a contracting branch exists. The challenge at this depth of logistical 
direction is not having actual contract authority and having to integrate regional logistical 
support across each service within a country and across countries. 
 
Figure 24.   USCENTCOM Organizational Structure 
(After USCENTCOM, 2007) 
 
The mission of the USCENTCOM J4 Operations/Contracting cell within 
USCENTCOM consists of: creating policy and plans for USCENTCOM AOR 
contracting, exercising C2 and authority for effective execution of AOR contracting 
requirements, and serving as acquisition advisors for headquarters, USCENTCOM 
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Commander, and the J4 staff. The cell focuses on three areas: establishing clear lines of 
C2 through lead service components, securing visibility into AOR contracting through 
reporting, and developing, integrating and coordinating contingency contracting 
operational plans. However, USCENTCOM does not have contracting authority, which 
remains at the individual service, combat support, and select functional unified command 
level (United States Central Command, 2007). One tool attempting to integrate 
contracted logistic support within a country is the designation of an executive agent. 
c. Executive Agent 
Executive Agent designation stems from the Secretary or Deputy 
Secretary of Defense; he assigns specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to a 
theater contracting activity to support the joint force to integrate common-use logistics 
between two or more DoD components (United States Joint Forces Command, 2007).  
The contracting cell within USCENTCOM J4 Logistics is the lead 
component for joint logistics and contracting. However, services execute contracting 
authority within, and in support of, USCENTCOM’s AOR. To secure a contract, another 
organization outside of USCENTCOM must agree to execute that contract. 
USCENTCOM is assigned responsibility for coordinating joint logistics and contracting 
common item and common service-support functions. The lack of a joint strategic 
approach creates a fragmented region of contract authority for USCENTCOM to 
coordinate. Figure 25 first shows the AOR and below, the component command’s 
executive authority or lead component status within the fragmented region. Although a 
lead component is designated, other service components conduct contracting operations 




Figure 25.   USCENTCOM AOR and Service Component Authority 
(After USCENTCOM, 2007) 
The problem this fractionality creates is that no one contracting agency 
has oversight over all agencies executing contracts in theater. USCENTCOM identifies 
several operational effects stemming from this problem: inaccurate and untimely 
situational awareness of contracting activities, lack of ability to enforce command-wide 
contracting policies, inability to achieve unity of contracting effort to support the 
warfighter, and difficulty managing and directing contractor accountability and arming. 
This section discussed the origins of COCOMs stemming from a 
functional versus geographical debate. The current COCOM structure was introduced, 
along with the contingency planning process. COCOMs and contingency contracting 
section linked the planning process to the CCSP. Many contracting organizations are 





























section, contracting in contingency operations, will further discuss the most recent issues 
combatant commanders face with fragmented contracting support from service 
components in past and current operations. 
C. CONTRACTING IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
This section of the chapter discusses the actual problems and issues related to 
contingency contracting. An important point to note is that contingency contracting is not 
a new concept. For this reason, a brief background of how contracting has been used 
throughout American military history is essential. A more detailed analysis of recent 
contingency operations will follow and lead this investigation into the current contracting 
support organization for OEF and OIF, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 
(JCC-I/A). 
1. History 
In the late Eighteenth Century, the United States military was established via the 
American Revolutionary militia. The American Revolutionaries solely focused their 
organic capabilities on the war strategies and battles at hand. Consequently, the leaders 
heavily depended on external logistical support to provide basic life support to the troops, 
such as food, clothing, and shelter. The US government, even during its infancy, 
recognized the importance of outsourcing external support for the military (Luse, 
Madeline, Smith & Starr, 2005). Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance in 1781, 
stated, “in all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that 
contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the 
subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of an Army” (Luse, Madeline, Smith & 
Starr, 2005). Though the process was not formally recognized as contingency contracting 
at the time, the principles and objectives of the modern version of the process are 
identical to those Morris described. This direct purchase system, not unlike today’s 
contingency contracting, had its share of problems. George Washington and Alexander 
Hamilton observed that contractors were often more concerned with increasing their 
profits than with providing the supplies and services the Army required (Shrader, 1999). 
Another significant problem during this period was contractors failing to meet delivery 
requirements. A notable delinquent contract was Eli Whitney’s failure to meet delivery  
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schedule of 4,000 muskets to the War Department; the requirement was fulfilled eleven 
years after the established date (Nagle, 1992). Despite recurring problems, the military 
has continued to use private industry to augment its logistical force. 
The reliance on the private sector to provide logistical support has been a factor in 
numerous military operations throughout American history. Table 1 illustrates the types 
of goods and services that the military contracted for in support of various conflicts or 
contingency operations. An in-depth analysis of the more recent military operations will 
be examined in the following sections. 
Time Period Conflict Contracted Goods & Services 
1812 -1815 War of 1812 Uniforms, muskets, cannonballs, shells, construction 
(gun carriages, ammunition wagons), rations 
1861 -1865 Civil War Clothing, small arms, muskets, heavy ordinance, 
horses, construction projects, chartered/purchased 
gunboats and tugboats, railroad transportation of 
troops and supplies 
1914 – 1918 WWI Vehicles, aircraft, machine guns, food, construction, 
munitions, ships 
1939 – 1945 WWII Aircraft, munitions, ships, torpedoes, armed vehicles, 
fire-control equipment 
1965 – 1973 Vietnam Field rations, petroleum products, ammunition, 
construction, military aircraft 
Table 1.   Historical Types of Contracted Goods and Services 
(After Nagle, 1999) 
 
2. Operation Desert Storm (ODS) 
ODS, like other contingency operations, had its fair share of problems in terms of 
contracting once US troops were in theater. The stateside contracting process for 
equipment requirements that could be fulfilled within six months was streamlined by the 
Air Force through the development of the Rapid Response Process (RRP). The RRP was 
initiated in order to accelerate standard procurement processes to be more responsive to 
the requirements supporting ODS (Killen & Wilson, 1992). According to Killen and 
Wilson (1992), the only items that would be considered as a RRP program were items 
commercially available, items in the final stages of development, or items that were early 
pilot production types of equipment. The RRP significantly reduced the administrative  
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burden, allowing essential equipment procurement be expedited and shipped to the 
warfighter. Although efforts were being made by the services to better support their 
respective troops, contracting problems on the ground were not avoided. 
Killen and Wilson provide numerous examples of problems that the contingency 
contracting officers supporting ODS in-theater encountered. Since the contingency 
contracting officers operated with much autonomy and little or no administrative support, 
they spent a great deal of time on contracting-support issues. Time spent on developing 
the vendor base, training other contingency contracting officers coming into theater who 
had minimal experience, and working through the language barriers while ensuring the 
vendors understood the requirement and terms of the contracts were daily issues facing 
the contingency contracting officer (Killen & Wilson, 1992). Another significant problem 
is that “there appears to be a definite need for requirements to be consolidated among 
units before writing contracts for individual units” (Killen & Wilson, 1992). Problems 
similar to those of ODS resurfaced later in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
3. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)   
The research conducted for this report found very little information regarding the 
status of contracting support in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003, when US troops entered 
Iraq. This is most likely due to the small amount of reconstruction in Afghanistan as 
compared to Iraq and the funding being at a much lower level than in OIF. Therefore, this 
section draws heavily on AARs from the contingency contracting officers in Afghanistan. 
In October 2001, when troops entered Afghanistan, their contracting support 
personnel were plagued with many of the same problems that their predecessors faced a 
decade earlier during ODS. A lack of a contracting organizational structure, inefficient 
resource allocation, and minimal training to the incoming contingency contracting 
officers were a few of the deficiencies during the initial phases of OEF. Not having a 
coordinated contracting structure in a joint contingency environment led to many other 
problems. 
In the summer of 2004, there were five main military installations supporting 
operations in Afghanistan: Bagram Airfield, Kabul Compound, Kandahar Airfield, 
Salerno and Karshi Khanabad in Uzbekistan (K2). One contingency contracting officer 
reported that in June 2004, there were contracting offices at four of the five 
68  
installations—consisting of 23 contracting personnel supporting approximately 40,300 
troops (Thaxton, 2004). In addition to troop support, the military contracting officers had 
to provide contracting support to the State Department and were not trained in USC Title 
22 procurement policies. Manning shortages and the uncertainty of replacements for 
redeploying contracting officers significantly impacted the dual support role (Thaxton, 
2004). Although a review of the AARs revealed a multitude of problems in Afghanistan, 
contingency contracting officers were resourceful in their acquisitions. 
Despite the manning issues in Kandahar, a company grade officer was able to 
leverage the vendor bases of other contingency contracting officers throughout the 
USCENTCOM AOR. Although a theater-wide system of synchronizing efforts between 
the contracting offices did not exist, he tapped into the resources of contingency 
contracting officers already located in Karachi, Pakistan, and Seeb, Oman, to obtain the 
essential supplies not available in Afghanistan (Rockow, 2003). There was also the 
potential to employ the vendor base of Dubai, UAE, at a later time. An approach such as 
this can be taken to a higher level and may provide a positive impact in terms of 
economies of scale. Centralizing like requirements to one activity and decentralizing the 
ordering authority on a contract vehicle (such as a blanket purchase agreement, BPA) 
would make efficient use of an inadequately staffed contracting office (Rockow, 2003). 
This concept is further explained in the section on the joint contracting command. 
When troops entered Iraq in March 2003, there was no unity of effort with regards 
to contracting throughout either Iraq or Afghanistan or between the two countries. 
Similar problems had been seen during the build-up phase of OEF almost two years prior. 
Again, there was no structure in place to support the contracting efforts—forcing multiple 
units to operate on their own with no coordination or communication with other units. 
The reconstruction effort in Iraq experienced unity-of-effort issues as well, but not to the 
extent of the contracting in support of the forces. The following sections discuss 
contracting operations in Iraq in terms of both the support of the forces and the 
reconstruction effort; they will also investigate the organizations that provide contracting 
support to each. The incorporation of diverse contracting support organizations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq into one central authority will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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4. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Supporting the Force  
During the initial build-up phase of OIF, there were only 24 military contingency 
contracting officers supporting approximately 120,000 troops on the ground (Cunnane, 
2005). These contracting support personnel were operating independently of one another. 
As the operation transitioned into the sustainment phase, more than a year after the 
operation had begun, additional contingency contracting officers were slowly entering the 
theater. Because the initial structure of the contracting organization was not set-up to 
support a prolonged sustainment phase, the problems that contracting officers 
encountered grew in volume and complexity. 
Not unlike contingency contracting officers deployed in support of OEF, those 
supporting OIF produced a plethora of AARs. Two specific AARs, reviewed from Balad 
Air Base and Tallil Air Base, provide insight into the issues that contingency contracting 
officers were facing over a year into the operation. Balad’s main concern was issues 
pertaining to delivery of goods (Moody, 2004). Consolidation and prioritization of 
requirements were significant issues that were stressed by the Tallil office (Bailey, 2004). 
Additionally, the Tallil office was adamant about consolidating the two contracting 
offices on the air base. The office chief felt that his efforts to consolidate the two Tallil 
offices for economy of scale efficiencies and to share vendor bases were disregarded by 
higher authorities (Bailey, 2004). 
Collocated contracting offices developed their vendor base independently of one 
another and typically created competition between them due to the duplication of effort. 
There was little communication and information sharing between the different 
contracting organizations. Contingency contracting officers stressed the need for 
consolidating requirements to their customers; however, this remained at the tactical level 
and was not pushed to any central contracting office for further possible consolidation. In 
the case of the Tallil officer, consolidation efforts of this magnitude didn’t come to 
fruition because no action was taken to consolidate the offices—a stepping stone to 
having a more strategic effect. 
Establishing a joint contracting organization was one solution that the acquisition 
leadership had been discussing. When it was introduced in the summer of 2004, many of 
the contingency contracting officers concurred with the need for a joint contracting 
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concept and welcomed its potential benefits. However, the Balad contracting officer was 
not a proponent for the joint command in Balad at that time, since the base was still in the 
build-up phase. Moody (2004) noted in his AAR that the implementation of a joint 
contracting organization should be evaluated for each contingency operation 
independently of each other; it is not a single solution for every situation. Other 
challenges the Balad office encountered during the first few months of the transition into 
the sustainment phase were shortages of construction supplies from the local economy, 
long lead-time for delivery of supplies due to significant security issues, security 
concerns for local vendors, and contracting personnel being tasked by other units for non-
contracting duties (Moody, 2004). Leveraging resources from other contracting offices in 
a particular country may provide relief for many of these problems. Figure 26 illustrates 
the multiple contracting offices often operating on the same base or within a region of 
multi-national division.  
 
 
Figure 26.   Geographical Representation of Contracting Offices in Iraq 
(After Winiecki, 2005) 
 
With little contract support personnel available in-theater, the need for 
coordination between contracting officers was becoming more obvious. Once the 
operation had begun its transition into sustainment, the acquisition leadership pushed for 
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a joint environment by establishing an acquisition plan that would span the entire AOR of 
Iraq. An essential element for an effective sustainment-based strategy is creating unity 
among the different contracting efforts in Iraq (Cunnane, 2005). Establishing unity of 
effort within the DoD was an enormous task and would take time to develop, organize, 
and implement. It was a task that could have been mitigated at the forefront of the 
planning process. The failure to define contracting and procurement roles and 
responsibilities resulted in a fragmented system that did not allow for the collaboration 
and coordination of contracting and procuring strategies (Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction, 2006). 
The next section will illustrate the myriad Iraqi reconstruction management 
offices that have evolved since the onset of OIF. The previous sections on force support 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the following section on reconstruction, will be used 
later to discuss the recent merger into the joint contracting command. 
5. Iraq Reconstruction and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) 
In an effort to manage the potential reconstruction requirements, the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was officially established in April 
2003. The ORHA’s mission was to define the scope of the reconstruction effort, as well 
as to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraq. In May 2003, the DoD established the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to serve as a temporary government. Realizing the 
magnitude of the reconstruction to be accomplished was too great and that the 
humanitarian assistance requirement never materialized, the CPA absorbed ORHA in 
June 2003; together, they became the reconstruction management office (Draft: PCO 
history, 2007). In November 2003, the US DoD established the Program Management 
Office (PMO) under the CPA to manage the reconstruction projects and to aide in 
stabilizing the Iraqi economy. Initial contracts for reconstruction of the Iraqi 
infrastructure were awarded in March 2004. In May 2004, the National Security 
Presidential Directive #36 ordered the establishment of the Project and Contracting 
Office (PCO) and the disbandment of the CPA due to the transfer of sovereignty to the 
Iraqi Interim Government, therefore dissolving the PMO (Draft: PCO history, 2007). The  
PCO assumed the program management responsibilities for reconstruction in Iraq. 
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The PCO’s program management approach to operating in a contingency 
environment proved to be an effective tool. By employing a cross-functional team to 
include engineering, finance, contracting, and logistics, the PCO was able to successfully 
accomplish its mission. In December 2005, the PCO merged with the US Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE), Gulf Region Division (GRD). The following section explains how 
contracting in support of the coalition forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the GRD’s 
contracting requirements were all pulled together to form the Joint Contracting 
Command. 
6. Evolution of the Joint Contracting Command—Iraq/Afghanistan 
Within a year of putting troops on the ground in Iraq, the challenges facing the 
contracting leadership were daunting. To meet these challenges, the concept of a Joint 
Contracting Command—Iraq was introduced to support and sustain coalition forces, 
rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure, reduce LOGCAP dependency, and to provide an 
organizational structure to support theater contracting operations (Cunnane, 2005). This 
section will explain the early stages of the development of the Joint Contracting 
Command-Iraq (JCC-I) and incorporation of Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) into the Joint 
Contracting Command by means of USCENTCOM fragmentary orders (FRAGO). The 
information draws heavily upon an article published by LT Danny Houglan in Army ALT 
magazine, January-March 2006, entitled “Evolution of the Joint Contracting Command-
Iraq/Afghanistan” (Houglan, 2006). 
a. FRAGO 09-668 
In November 2004, USCENTCOM issued FRAGO 09-668, creating the 
JCC-I as a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq 
(MNF-I). The focus of consolidating contracting organization/reporting relationships was 
to create a unity of effort in providing contracting support to leverage contracting 
resources and expertise for efficiency across the entire theater of Iraq (United States 
Central Command, 2004). To facilitate contracting efficiency, the Assistant Secretary of 
the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, having already been designated 
DoD executive agent for contracting in Iraq, established the commander, the JCC-I as the 
head of contracting activity (HCA) for Iraq reconstruction and coalition forces  
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contracting support. The JCC-I was established on January 29, 2005, and immediately set 
out to build the then-nascent command and integrate itself as one of the five MSCs under 
MNF-I. 
b. FRAGO 09-790 
In July 2005, USCENTCOM issued FRAGO 09-790, rescinding FRAGO 
09-668 to update contracting and organizational changes requested by USCENTCOM 
and recently executed by the Department of the Army. The purpose of this FRAGO was 
to unite contracting efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan—bringing contracting in Afghanistan 
under JCC-I HCA authority (United States Central Command, 2005). 
c. FRAGO 09-1117 
In November 2006, USCENTCOM issued FRAGO 09-1117, directing the 
commanders in-theater (including MNF-I and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-76 in 
Afghanistan), along with the service component commanders (including ARCENT, 
CENTAF, MARCENT, and NAVCENT), to update their contracting organizations and 
relationships within USCENTCOM’s AOR to better achieve unity of effort in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (United States Central Command, 2006). Two years after establishing a joint 
contracting command, there were still a multitude of problems—many of which derived 
from a lack of unity of effort within both AORs. Throughout its evolution, JCC-I/A has 
formed by incrementally assimilating contracting organizations that were providing 
piecemeal support to coalition forces. USCENTCOM and JCC-I/A conducted a review of 
the contracting function in Iraq and Afghanistan, finding increasing demand for scarce 
contracting assets and the need for a centralized contracting organization with complete 
visibility over all contracting efforts for forces in both AORs (United States Central 
Command, 2006). 
FRAGO 09-1117 explains that the end-state for the JCC-I/A contains three 
significant objectives. The JCC-I/A must: 1) Integrate warfighter campaign plans and 
strategy and achieve effects through contracting that further support the warfighters’ 
objectives, 2) Achieve unity of effort, economies of scale that exemplify best business 
practices, and serve as a model for commerce in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 3) Create 
synergy with economic activities in local private and public sectors, serving as a catalyst 
for economic growth and the resulting peace (United States Central Command, 2006).   
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Although the JCC-I/A has evolved a great deal since its inception, its 
mission has not changed too much. According to a JCC-I/A brief given at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in January 2007, the JCC-I/A’s mission is to: 
 
Provide responsive operational contracting support to the Chiefs of 
Mission, Multi-National Forces—Iraq and Combined Forces Command—
Afghanistan to efficiently acquire vital supplies, services and construction 
in support of the Coalition Forces and the relief and reconstruction of Iraq 
and Afghanistan; provide capacity building to establish effective 
contracting and procurement processes within the Iraqi and Afghani 
Ministries to build and sustain self-sufficient security forces (JCC-I/A, 
2007, January). 
 
The organizational structure has been instrumental to the JCC-I/A’s 
success. The JCC-I/A continues making a tremendous impact throughout both theaters of 
operation by providing diverse contracting support to a multitude of customers.  The next 
section discusses the organization of the JCC-I/A.  
7. JCC-I/A Organization 
The unexpected lengthy sustainment phase and the significant amount of troops 
that are still required to secure Iraq have warranted organizational growth and 
transformation over the JCC-I/A’s first two years in command and control. Initially, the 
commander of the JCC-I/A appointed two principle assistants responsible for contracting 
(PARC)—one for support of the forces, PARC-Forces (PARC-F), and one for support of 
reconstruction efforts, PARC-Reconstruction (PARC-R). From the onset, each PARC 
played a key role in the organization. The fundamental responsibility of each PARC is to 
provide operational contracting support to his/her respective customer base. However, the 
customer base for PARC-F and PARC-R is vastly different. As time passed and the JCC-
I/A gained more operational control, the role of the PARCs shifted. 
The current configuration is that two PARCs remain; however, their 
responsibilities have shifted. Currently, the JCC-I/A has a PARC for Iraq and another 
PARC for Afghanistan, each responsible for forces as well as reconstruction support in 
their respective AOR. Figure 27 shows the current JCC-I/A structure and relationship 
between customers. The remainder of this section will discuss the PARC for each AOR 
and his/her relationship within Figure 27. 
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a. PARC-IRAQ 
PARC-Iraq and the Iraq Operations Officer support Multi-National 
Forces—Iraq (MNF-I), Multi-National Corps—Iraq (MNC-I), and provides contracting 
support to the State Department’s Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) and 
the USACE GRD as they provide for the relief and reconstruction of the country. When 
the PCO was absorbed into GRD, the JCC-I/A assumed the contracting responsibility for 
GRD’s reconstruction efforts. PARC-Iraq and the Iraq operations officer also provide 
contracting support to the Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTC-
I) whose primary tasking is to rebuild Iraq’s Security Forces. PARC-Iraq’s focus is on 
policy and procedures for theater-wide contracting, whereas the Iraq operations officer 
manages the daily contracting requirements and issues that occur throughout the regional 
offices under his control. 
b. PARC-Afghanistan 
PARC-Afghanistan provides contracting support to the CJTF-76 in order 
to meet warfighter needs. PARC-Afghanistan also supports the Combined Security 
Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which is responsible for training and 
equipping Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. 
 
Figure 27.   JCC-I/A Support Structure 
(From JCC-I/A, 2007, January) 
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8. Strategic Importance of JCC-I/A 
The establishment of JCC-I/A has been a vast improvement over past contingency 
operations and the previous methods through which the DoD approached contingency 
contracting. This organization has transformed the way the DoD conducts business in a 
contingency environment. Unity of effort is essential, and a shift to strategic thinking in 
terms of procurement will have long-lasting effects. 
The formation of the JCC-I/A has proven to be an invaluable asset to the 
commanders in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2006, the JCC-I/A accomplished 
near 27,000 contractual actions valued at approximately $5.7 billion. Moreover, 59% of 
the contract actions and 39% of the total dollars awarded were awarded to Host Nation 
companies (2006). Building the local and national economies is an essential element of 
the commander’s strategy, and it has been realized that contracting plays a significant 
role in this regard. 
The JCC-I/A’s focus of establishing a self-reliant Iraq is illustrated through close 
coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI). One key 
element that is enabling the JCC-I/A to reach this required end-state is the contracting 
advisors that the Command has embedded within MOD and MOI. JCC-I/A advisors, 
along with coalition and State Department advisors, continue to assist MOD and MOI 
officials with building self-sufficient procurement systems and processes. 
The JCC-I/A’s continued success throughout USCENTCOM shows that an 
organization such as this can serve as a model for future joint contingency operations of 
this magnitude. This holds especially true for operations in which there will be a 
significant reconstruction effort taking place. As discussed in a previous section, the joint 
model will not work in every situation. Nonetheless, the lessons learned through the 
evolution of JCC-I/A can guide future operations in strategically avoiding the adverse 
effects of a lack of sufficient planning prior to an operation. Planning for contingencies 
within the CCSP must be incorporated early enough for acquisition professionals to 
assess the economic environment and market structures of the operational area in terms 
of vendor base and availability of goods and services. This analysis must not only asses 




Operating in a joint environment appears to be a constant struggle from one 
contingency operation to the next in terms of contracting support. Each service has its 
own tactics, techniques, and procedures through which to provide contracting support to 
its customer.  This chapter has discussed the meaning of contingency operations, 
contingency contracting, the military reorganization efforts in the US, the reorganization 
effects on the unified combatant commanders and the joint planning process, and the 
myriad problems that have been addressed by contingency contracting officers on the 
battlefield, as well as by senior acquisition leadership. Chapter Four will show how 
industry’s best practices can be applied to the joint planning process where contingency 
contracting is concerned. This top-down, strategic view of contingency contracting is one 




































IV. FINDINGS: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY 
CONTRACTING 
A strategic approach to contingency contracting requires the DoD to take an 
enterprise approach to procurement within geographic regions aligning with the 
combatant commander’s strategic objectives. The framework within this chapter 
emphasizes not only unity and coordination of contracting effort within a contingency 
theater, but also unity and coordination of contracting within geographic theaters. 
Conducting spend analysis across geographic regions can rationalize suppliers by 
segmenting many small requirements into broad categories. These broad categories allow 
the development of sourcing strategies from which individual commodity strategies can 
be developed. A geographic procurement strategy will enable the DoD to capture 
maximum value from suppliers of goods and services. This strategy will greatly improve 
the planning process and allow the DoD to harness geographic suppliers for future 
contingencies. Applying a strategic approach presents opportunities for the DoD to 
identify key geographic suppliers providing maximum value and to use contracting as a 
strategic tool to inject sustainability and value-creation within supply markets. 
This chapter presents two sections. The first section, Strategic Approach: Value, 
Competitive Advantage, & DoD, identifies a means for the DoD to capture maximum 
value from goods and services in two ways. First, the Department can lower price by a 
greater amount than product value. Second, it can increase product value by a greater 
amount than price. Scarce resources dictate capturing maximum value. Additionally, a 
strategic approach to contingency contracting requires a strategic approach to acquisition. 
The second section, Strategic Approach to Contingency Contracting, builds on the value 
premise to create an acquisition framework for unity and coordination of effort within a 
regional geographic theater. By harnessing key supplier relationships within geographic 
regions, the DoD can favorably decrease cost as a function of value and influence supply 




A. STRATEGIC APPROACH: VALUE, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, & 
DOD 
A strategic approach to contingency contracting dove-tails many principles 
commercial firms use to gain a competitive advantage within markets. The heart of 
competitive advantage is creating value in excess of what rivals create in terms of cost to 
customer willingness-to-pay (Ghemwhat & Rivkin, 2006). This section will first present 
two sub-sections, Value and Competitive Advantage, as a primer detailing commercial 
principles which apply to the DoD. The final sub-section discusses the DoD and 
Competitive Advantage; it investigates how the DoD can apply commercial techniques to 
both lower cost and increase product value for strategic effects—known in the 
commercial sector as competitive advantage. 
1. Value 
Firms jockey within markets to create value positions. A transaction’s total value 
is the difference between the customer’s willingness-to-pay for a product or service and 
the supplier’s opportunity cost or willingness-to-sell (Ghemwhat & Rivkin, 2006). Figure 
28 presents value incorporating the customer, firm, and supplier. 
 
 
Figure 28.   Value 




2. Competitive Advantage 
A firm’s added value to the marketplace is a concept which plays a large role in 
determining profit; it also links to competitive advantage. A firm’s added value is the 
wedge it establishes between customer willingness-to-pay and supplier opportunity cost 
beyond what rivals achieve. The example on the next page uses actual product costs, not 
supplier opportunity costs, because such data is more readily available and concrete. The 
firm with the widest added value or wedge has a competitive advantage within the 
industry (Ghemwhat & Rivkin, 2006). 
Figure 29 illustrates two types of competitive advantage, differentiation on the left 
and low-cost on the right (Coughlan, 2007). In each of the two cases, the firm on the left 
has a competitive advantage or wedge of one unit. Under differentiation, the firm on the 
left can set price at three units, providing five units of value to the consumer. The firm on 
the right must set price at one unit, or its cost to provide a commensurate value to the 
consumer. The same logic holds true under a low-cost strategy. The firm on the left can 
set price at three units—forcing the firm on the right to set price at its cost of four units. 
The firm on the left has a competitive advantage and added value of one unit to the 





Figure 29.   Competitive Advantage 
(After Coughlan, 2007) 
A firm can establish an advantage in two ways: 1) reduce supplier 
opportunity/input costs without sacrificing commensurate product value/customer 
willingness-to-pay or 2) increase product value/customer willingness-to-pay without 
incurring a commensurate increase to cost (Ghemwhat & Rivkin, 2006). 
Generating competitive advantage typically links to industry analysis to devise 
strategies which neutralize unattractive industry features and accentuate attractive 
features. Industry analysis, presented in Chapter II, exhibits Porter’s five competitive 
forces shaping strategy: customers, suppliers, potential entrants, substitute products, and 
existing competitors. Additionally, Porter’s value chain, also presented in Chapter II, 
catalogs a firm’s activities (such as procurement, marketing, logistics, etc.), which 
influence both product cost and willingness-to-pay (Porter, 1980). Competitive advantage 
can come from better management of supplier relations to streamline supply chains, 







producer (Ghemwhat & Rivkin, 2006). Many firms take a strategic approach to 
procurement as a way to gain a competitive advantage, including those presented in 
Chapter II: IBM, Dell, John Deere, and Flour. 
In addition to industry analysis, creativity in capturing opportunity and 
competitive advantage exists within markets in the form of entrepreneurial insight 
(Ghemwhat & Rivkin, 2006). Entrepreneurial insight identifies opportunities within 
markets to create and capture value. This can come in the form of a new offering, for 
example. Entrepreneurial insight can also come in the form of mapping existing 
offering’s attributes and the corresponding effects on cost and willingness-to-pay in 
efforts to capture value (McGrath & MacMillan, 2000). This is similar to mapping value 
chain activities and the corresponding influence on product cost and customer 
willingness-to-pay. 
3. DoD and Competitive Advantage 
Corporations are profit-driven. Identifying opportunities to increase and capture 
product value equates to increasing the bottom line. The DoD is not profit driven in the 
same sense; however, the DoD will most likely always have more needs than money. 
This assumption requires the DoD to identify opportunities to capture more net value 
from products. The same two ways commercial firms gain competitive advantage are the 
same two ways the DoD can capture more net value from products in the marketplace. 
First, the Department can organize purchases to create efficiencies or economies of scale 
to lower cost, thus capturing more net value and cost savings without sacrificing a greater 
amount of product value or willingness-to-pay. Second, the DoD can also work with 
producers on opportunities in the supply markets to favorably increase product value 
without a larger increase to cost. 
Commercial firms and the DoD share many of the same techniques to acquire 
profit and maximize product value respectively. The remainder of this section discusses 
three techniques both commercial firms and the DoD use to capture value within markets. 
Each of these apply to a contingency framework: Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), 





Commercial firms use value chain activities to affect cost and consumer 
willingness-to-pay positions. The DoD uses Integrated Product Teams (IPT) in the same 
sense, grouping different job specialties for an acquisition to affect the value captured. 
The integrating of functional disciplines plays a key role in ensuring each business unit 
fits within the overall strategy and mission of the organization. 
b. Strategic Approach to Procurement 
Firms implement a strategic approach to procurement for the purpose of 
managing internal requirements across business units and external supplier relations. 
These efforts attempt to favorably influence cost as a function of value. The DoD uses 
commodity councils and regional purchasing centers to the same effect, trading profits to 
capture more net value by reducing costs. In either context, this occurs by analyzing 
organizational requirements spend into categories, as Kraljic presents, according to 
market complexity and organizational strategic importance to derive individual 
commodity strategies of varying complexity (Kraljic, 1983). Figure 30 exhibits the 
paradigm shift between tactical purchasing and strategic sourcing to tailor commodity 
strategies according to strategic importance and market complexity. 
 
 
Figure 30.   Strategic Model 




c. Commodity Strategies 
Laseter, within his seven commodity sourcing strategies, identifies the 
need to segment spend within products to identify key drivers (Laseter, 1998). This 
coincides with McGrath and MacMillan’s product attribute map, which maps current 
product attributes, cost-to-value relationships, and opportunities to improve future 
product offerings. Opportunities exist to improve cost-to-value position by eliminating 
less desirable attributes and adding desirable attributes to product offerings in pursuit of 
improving the value the product yields (McGrath & MacMillan, 2000). Each idea relates 
to the DoD using cost as an independent variable (CAIV) to make product attribute trade-
offs as a function of cost-to-value. 
Spend analysis across all organizational purchases can rationalize 
suppliers by categorizing them for specific commodity strategies to improve a cost 
position, which is strategic. A pure commodity—with which differentiation has no 
value—is an example which can allow the DoD to improve its cost position through a 
leverage strategy. However, the analysis is also important to identify supplier and 
producer markets, which the DoD can strategize to favorably influence product value or 
the quality and sustainability of the market itself, which is also strategic. An important 
aspect to a strategic approach and spend analysis is the ability to influence strategic 
markets of key suppliers critical to the DoD and its mission. The DoD can do this by 
tailoring commodity strategies for strategic effects. 
Thus far, this chapter addresses the DoD’s cost and value position to 
capture more net value from products. The DoD’s purchasing power as a whole is a key 
strategic tool. For example, set-asides for small, underutilized, disabled veteran- and 
women-owned businesses are a strategic public policy objective. Within the context of a 
contingency, the DoD’s purchasing power can rebuild Iraq as a strategic objective but can 
also interdict the supply markets within Iraq; this arrangement will play a vital role to 
ensure the sustainability of the infrastructure. Identifying not only producers of finished 
products is key to long-term stability, but also identifying the producers of commodities, 
sub-assemblies, and assemblies within the supply chain. 
Creating a competitive advantage or capturing value requires integrating 
all of the firm’s activities in some form of a multi-functional team aligning with overall 
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strategy.  A strategic approach to procurement requires a strategic approach to many 
other functions within the multi-functional team; this combination will identify 
requirements yielding the most value as a function of cost to willingness-to-pay. By 
utilizing Lambert’s supply chain, Figure 31, strategists can centralize demand to 
influence product price as a tier-one consumer. As a tier-three customer, a firm’s value is 
lost through the consumer tiers because of a rise in price with a constant product value. 
Increasing the amount of value the DoD captures can also come by identifying cost 
drivers or value drivers of products to strategically wield influence within tiers of supply 
markets. Such influence seems unattainable as a fragmented buyer at tier three of the 
consumer market. The remainder of this paper will use this value and competitive 





Figure 31.   Supply Chain 
(From Lambert, Cooper & Pagh 1998) 
 
B. STRATEGIC APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING 
Two possible strategic approaches to contingency contracting present themselves 
to unite contracting efforts within contingency theaters and the greater geographic 
commands. The first solution centralizes contract authority within each geographic 
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COCOM to integrate all contracting activities within a geographic region. The second 
solution creates an outside organization with contract authority to meet the geographic 
Combatant Commander’s requirements and unify contracting efforts within only a 
contingency theater. 
This paper presents three subsections on a strategic approach to contingency 
contracting. The first sub-section, Considerations to a Strategic Approach, discusses both 
solutions and the basis for combining attributes from each of the two, creating a hybrid 
solution. The second sub-section, Contingency Theater of Operations, presents the 
Contingency Acquisition Support Office (CASO), in draft form at USD (ALT), to 
provide a deployable contingency acquisition capability for geographic Combatant 
Commanders. The third sub-section, Combatant Command Area of Responsibility, 
presents value and competitive advantage principles to strategically approach acquisition 
within geographic COCOMs. This integrates and coordinates contracting activities within 
the greater geographical COCOM; in this way, the strategy can identify widespread 
opportunities to lower price by a greater amount than willingness-to-pay and increase 
willingness-to-pay by less than a subsequent rise in cost. Commercial business tools 
present an opportunity to analyze requirement spend across geographic regions by 
various agencies to key supplier relationships completing the framework. 
1. Considerations to a Strategic Approach 
Geographical COCOMs acquiring contracting authority increases responsibilities 
to a lean war-fighting organization. For instance, contract authority requires staff to deal 
with oversight from the Inspector General, GAO, and Congress in addition to general 
Freedom of Information Act requests and contract protest disputes. Additionally, 
individual services support operations within the geographic region of COCOMs to 
support the contingency theater. For these reasons, centralization of contracting within 
each geographic COCOM is not a viable solution. The COCOM’s role is crucial to 
integrate acquisition information within its respective AOR. Many opportunities exist to 
improve the DoD’s cost position and/or product value position. Contracting activities 
purchase requirements from various suppliers across a region at varying costs and  
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provide varying product value.  Coordinating these contracting activities to identify the 
key regional suppliers requires gathering and sharing essential acquisition information 
between the services as it relates to the regional geographic area. 
The CASO, explained in detail below, provides a strategic approach to uniting 
contracting activities by surging into a contingency theater. However, key suppliers of 
strategic importance exist within the larger geographic COCOM AOR. Since the CASO 
will only surge into a specific area in support of an operation, the CASO and each 
COCOM must form and maintain strong relationships. It is not feasible for the CASO to 
have cognizance over every COCOM’s regional market conditions. 
There is a tremendous opportunity for the DoD to capture more value and 
supplement the CASO by integrating and harnessing the network of suppliers throughout 
geographical COCOM AORs. Essential acquisition information can leverage purchases, 
identify key suppliers, and foster relationships with those suppliers. The hybrid approach 
presents the CASO within Contingency Theater of Operations and integrates regional 
suppliers within Combatant Commands Area of Responsibility—forming a strategic 
approach to contingency contracting. 
2. Contingency Theater of Operations 
The Undersecretary of Defense for Industrial Policy is proposing the development 
of the CASO. The CASO will be a multi-functional organization permanently located at 
USJFCOM, which would surge into a theater during a contingency operation. The CASO 
sets up a Joint Acquisition Command (JAC), much like the JCC-I/A, and operates as the 
acquisition division for the respective COCOM within the affected theater. The CASO 
will act as Executive Agent, under USJFCOM Title 10 contract authority, to support the 
Joint Force Commander (JFC) within a declared contingency theater (USD, 2006). 
The CASO will function as a Program Office similar to the USAF’s AMIC for 
services and systems program offices specializing in defense systems. Essentially, the 
combination of “effective contracting and program management in a contingency 
environment are the channels through which DoD’s allocation of national economic 
power flows to the responsible commander to enable his operational objectives and 
tactical assignments” (USD, 2006). The CASO unites acquisition efforts, not only those 
of contingency contracting, within a regional Combatant Commander’s theater under 
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USJFCOM Title 10 authority. This organization, if approved and implemented, will assist 
COCOMs in planning contingency acquisition requirements. When a contingency occurs, 
a small cadre of acquisition professionals will surge into the contingency theater of 
operations—forming a JAC and building up as the level of support necessitates. 
3. Combatant Commands Area of Responsibility 
COCOM logistics directorates will play a key role in the strategic framework 
necessary for the DoD to meet the objectives of improving cost positions, increasing 
product value within theater, and boosting regional economies. The foundation for 
achieving these objectives is information—acquisition information that service 
component command’s (i.e., USARCENT, USNAVCENT, USCENTAF, 
USMARCENT) tactical offices throughout a region hold. Integrating this information 
with commercial business tools at the COCOM level and simply coordinating and 
disseminating it is a starting point. The JCC-I/A, for example, is successful at capturing 
information on contract actions within its AOR, but this communication needs to be taken 
to a larger level. 
The DoD needs to develop an acquisition information system that will enable 
geographic COCOMs to integrate and coordinate the essential acquisition information 
from all contracting organizations throughout its respective AOR. Through the 
integration of this information within an AOR, COCOMs can conduct spend analyses to 
better understand what is actually procured in their respective geographical areas. 
Classifying goods and services according to their level of strategic importance and 
market complexity using Kraljic’s portfolio model creates broad sourcing categories 
(Kraljic, 1983). From these broad categories, commodity strategies can be developed for 
individual goods and services. This will lead to a more focused approach to procurement 
of the goods and services that potentially provide the strategic effects discussed earlier in 
this section. This will enable the services to capture more net value from geographic 
operations supporting contingency theaters from appropriated money to support routine 
service operations. 
An analysis of the information will allow the acquisition leadership at the 
COCOM level to identify key suppliers of the goods and services that have a strategic 
impact within the AOR. Identifying the two or three tier-one suppliers will enable 
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contracting officers to improve their cost positions (from the position they have when 
they contract with the tier-three or -four suppliers). As discussed in the Cost/Value 
Position section of this chapter, the middlemen, tier-one through -three suppliers in the 
Lambert supply chain model (Figure 31), increase the cost while providing little or no 
additional value to the product. Both the DoD and the contractor can benefit if the 
Department develops business relationships farther back in the supply chain with those 
suppliers having the competitive advantage within their relative market. 
For the DoD, knowledge of the aggregate demand for an entire COCOM AOR is 
powerful negotiation information. Suppliers will most likely be more apt to lower prices 
if they share the strategic view of the DoD’s demand. An increased awareness of the 
DoD’s theater-wide demand would also give the product producer better bargaining 
power within its own supply chains. Additionally, by dealing with the primary suppliers, 
the DoD is positioned to potentially increase the value gained from certain goods and 
services while minimally increasing cost.  A joint contracting organization during 
contingency operations, such as the CASO, could leverage these existing supplier 
relationships during all phases of an operation. 
C. SUMMARY 
A strategic approach to contingency contracting places two fingers on the pulse of 
regional supply markets. The beat of the pulse can identify opportunities for the DoD to 
craft commodity strategies which favorably reduce cost as a function of value and/or 
favorably increase value as a function of cost, in the commercial sector this creates a 
competitive advantage.  This chapter discussed how a commercial firm strives to capture 
more value than their competitors to create a competitive advantage and how this 
principle applies to the DoD. The remainder of the chapter discussed two actions for the 
DoD to implement a strategic approach to procurement not only in a contingency theater 
but within a geographic theater. 
First, an organization like the CASO must control contracting activities within a 
contingency theater. The CASO would be the first DoD organization to network with 
other governmental and non-governmental agencies in order to properly and productively 
prepare acquisition operations for any future contingency (USD, 2006). Second, spend 
analysis must integrate the services’ network of supply chains with a COCOM’s 
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geographical area, thus identifying areas in which to capture more value. The COCOM’s 
do not need to control the services’ acquisition process to support the contingency 
theater. The acquisition information simply needs to aggregate at a central point to 
identify opportunities for the DoD to capture more value and achieve regional strategic 
objectives. This geographic supply network will provide supply base for the CASO to 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION & AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the findings from the literature review, 
analysis of contingency contracting, and the recommendations for a strategic approach to 
contingency contracting. While performing research for this report, the authors noted 
specific areas worthy of further analysis. These areas will be discussed in further detail 
later in this chapter. Finally, this chapter includes a conclusion based on the literature that 
is presented in this report. 
A. SUMMARY 
Chapter II discussed the evolution of purchasing into supply management, which 
is a strategic approach to procurement. Purchasing, as a source of competitive advantage, 
is linked to the recognition of procurement’s strategic significance within an 
organization’s strategy. An organization, commercial or military, must acknowledge that 
purchasing has considerable strategic importance and has the potential to create 
substantial value to the end-user. From this realization, an organization can centralize 
enterprise spend. Centralizing spend enables the development of broad sourcing 
strategies, according to the importance of product and complexity of the market, to 
leverage buying power. From broad sourcing categories, commodity sourcing strategies 
can be developed for individual goods and service. 
Chapter III examined the stages of a contingency, the COCOMs’ functional 
control of forces, and the planning and execution of contracting. The chapter also noted 
that COCOMs must rely on services for contracting support since COCOMs have no 
contract authority. In addition, the chapter provided a review of the problems encountered 
on the battlefield, past and present, in terms of contracting support. Each service 
continues to have its own tactics, techniques, and procedures to provide contracting 
support to its customer while operating in a contingency. Through an extensive 
examination of AARs, interviews, and governmental reports,  the researchers have 
determined the need for a strategic approach to contingency contracting. OIF lessons 
learned provided the DoD with constructive information that has developed into the 
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CASO concept and other initiatives that are transforming the DoD’s contingency 
contracting policy. FRAGOs 09-668, 09-790, 09-1117, in reference to JCC-I, 1) Integrate 
warfighter campaign plans and strategy to achieve effects through contracting that further 
support the warfighters’ objectives, 2) Achieve unity of efforts, economies of scales that 
exemplify best business practices, and serve as a model for commerce in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. As mentioned in Chapter III, a CCO in Kahdahar was able to leverage the 
vendor base of other CCOs throughout the USCENTCOM AOR despite dramatic 
manning issues. This type of vendor-base networking can benefit all CCOs within a 
geographic region and contingency theater. 
Chapter IV discussed the researchers’ recommendation for a strategic approach to 
contingency contracting. A centralized contingency acquisition office (i.e., CASO) will 
align procurement strategy with COCOM’s objectives. An organization like the CASO 
must control contracting activities within a contingency theater. The CASO would be the 
first DoD organization to network with other governmental and non-governmental 
agencies in order to properly and productively prepare acquisition operations for any 
future contingency (USD, 2006). By conducting spend analysis in geographic areas, 
services can integrate supply chains within a COCOM’s AOR—identifying areas where 
additional value may be captured. The COCOMs do not need to control the services’ 
acquisition process to support the contingency theater. By aggregating acquisition 
information at a central point, contracting officers will identify opportunities for the DoD 
to capture more value, achieve regional strategic objectives, and enhance planning for 
future contingency operations. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented the need for a strategic approach to contingency contracting. 
COCOM’s geographic AOR and regional contingency theaters are inundated with 
contracting support. This presents the DoD with opportunities to capture more value by 
identifying goods and services that have strategic implications. A central contingency 
acquisition organization, like the CASO, needs to establish C2 over theater-wide 
contracting requirements in future operations. Obligation authority is a key strategic 
tool—one which Combatant Commanders do not possess. This tool needs to align with 
95  
the Combatant Commanders’ strategic contingency objectives. For example, this strategic 
tool can not only rebuild a country but can also work to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of key strategic markets such as cement production, metal works, and 
facility and infrastructure repair. 
In addition, a spend analysis of geographic suppliers can reduce the defense 
contingency supply base, identifying opportunities to decrease cost by more than the 
subsequent trade-off to product value or increase product value by more than the 
subsequent trade-off to cost. In the commercial sector, these trade-offs enhance 
competitive market position and relate directly to competitive advantage. By identifying 
key regional suppliers through spend analysis, contingency contracting officers can both 
aid in planning and executing contingency contracting operations and increase the value 
the DoD captures in geographic markets. 
The spend analysis will provide the CASO-like organization with additional 
acquisition information for the specific theater of operation. The CASO-like organization 
senior leadership should be incorporated into the JPEC, or the upper echelons of the 
planning process, to feed this essential information into the JOPES. This integration 
would create a more robust CCSP, in which the data could be leveraged by the 
acquisition authority in-theater (i.e., deployed CASO CCO cell). In addition, a well-
documented CCSP will give the CCOs on the battlefield the necessary tool to assist the 
COCOMs in meeting their strategic objectives. 
Furthermore, a spend analysis will enable the DoD to identify opportunities to 
leverage potential strategic goods and services. The aggregation of strategic goods, 
coupled with the identification of key regional suppliers, can create value by reducing 
cost, leveraging the DoD’s buying power, and fostering supplier relationships. The key to 
success is for a CASO-like organization to actively conduct market surveillance, ensuring 
that the CCSP is aligned with current market conditions. As a result, transition between 
the four phases of a contingency operation would proceed more smoothly. 
This report provided ample support to justify the need for a strategic approach to 
contingency contracting. Current DoD initiatives are aligning contingency acquisition 
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support towards a more strategic framework; however, these initiatives are in their 
infancy stages. All lessons learned from OEF and OIF, as well as the business 
transformations, need to be incorporated into doctrine to ensure success in future 
contingency operations. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research in this report focuses on the application of a strategic framework to 
be used for in-theater procurement, not reach-back contracting, major weapons systems 
support, or other logistical support contracts awarded and administered stateside (i.e., 
LOGCAP). However, while conducting research for this report, the authors noted specific 
areas worthy of further analysis. The following recommendations for further research are 
directly tied to and further support the need for a strategic approach to contingency 
contracting. 
First, the DoD should conduct a spend analysis for OIF and determine what items, 
commodities, services can be strategically sourced. The Department can accomplish this 
by aggregating data contained in various contingency contracting databases/repositories. 
Kraljic’s portfolio model may serve as a useful tool for classifying goods and services 
into broad sourcing categories. By classifying theater purchases, decision-makers could 
have better insight into the following questions that may have strategic implications: 
• How can procurement fit within and assist a centralized acquisition office’s 
efforts to improve markets (such as cement, oil well maintenance, and water 
treatment) within the context of strategically sustaining a country? 
• What goods and services might business systems identify as widespread 
geographic candidates for improvements in cost positions and/or improvements in 
value positions?  
• What other DoD functions can form a tighter strategic fit with procurement, such 
as procuring more requirements like steel within regional supply markets to 
remove requirements from airlift? 
 
Second, spend analysis is a critical tool that can identify key acquisition information—
enabling the DoD leadership to leverage their buying power. This analysis is essential for 
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laying the foundation of a strategic contingency acquisition framework. The next area 
recommended for additional research is determining what activity, agency, organization 
is best suited to establish this framework.  
As mentioned earlier in this study, the DoD has a draft concept paper for the 
establishment of an organization, CASO, that could potentially serve as the catalyst for 
building a strategic framework to be applied in contingency operations. Further research 
could examine the relationship between the J-4’s in each respective COCOM and the 
CASO activity. After analyzing the integration of the CASO with each COCOM J-4, 
decision-makers could utilize the results to determine the feasibility of establishing one 
enterprise-wide CASO by answering the following questions: 
• Would it be more feasible to have a CASO-like organization structure in each 
geographical COCOM vice one enterprise-wide CASO? 
• Will integrating a CASO-like organization into each COCOM add value by 
having an acquisition structure that serves as an AOR supply-chain expert? 
• Will a single CASO have the ability to manage the necessary information being 
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